Foreign land deals in Tanzania
An update and a critical view on the challenges of data (re)production

Martina Locher & Emmanuel Sulle

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Abstract
In the absence of an easily available source of reliable up-to-date data on foreign land deals in Tanzania, many reports have been published that attempt to provide an overview of these deals. While providing this overview is challenging due to the dynamic and non-transparent nature of the ‘land grab’ phenomenon itself, it has become even more debatable due to certain questionable methods of using and quoting existing data. This leads to several flaws including the ‘virtual survival’ of cancelled land deals ‘on paper’. The consequences are an unnecessarily blurred picture of the land deal situation in Tanzania, and thus an inadequate basis for related political decisions or social actions and a misleading starting point for new research projects. In this paper we illustrate some of the flaws in the use of data so far and give an updated and carefully grounded overview of foreign land deals in Tanzania as of December 2012. Our compilation illustrates that, unlike in the past few years, biofuel projects are no longer the priority of foreign investors. Instead, they are focusing on the production of food crops such as rice, sugar and oil, as well as forestry plantations. This overview does not claim to be complete, but it does provide a traceable set of data, which can serve as a basis for further research as well as for much needed policy debates and decisions.

Keywords: Agricultural land deals; Inadequate data; Methodological flaws; Biofuels; Tanzania

About the authors


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# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRELA</td>
<td>Business Registrations and Licensing Agency (a Tanzanian Government Executive Agency, with an online database on registered companies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Developments Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>District Agriculture Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLNRO</td>
<td>District Land and Natural Resources Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLO</td>
<td>District Land Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Development Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Egyptian African Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Investigation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSC</td>
<td>Forest stewardship Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIGA</td>
<td>German Institute of Global Areas Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIED</td>
<td>International Institute for Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILC</td>
<td>International Land Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRC</td>
<td>Korean Rural Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUP</td>
<td>Land Use Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>LARRRI</td>
<td>Land Rights Research and Resources Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFS</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEM</td>
<td>Ministry of Energy and Minerals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFCO</td>
<td>National Agriculture and Food Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPOA</td>
<td>Research on Poverty Alleviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUBADA</td>
<td>Rufiji Basin Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEKAB</td>
<td>Svensk Etanolkemi AB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIC</td>
<td>Tanzanian Investment Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNRF</td>
<td>Tanzanian Natural Resource Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSh/TZS</td>
<td>Tanzanian Shilling</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRISD</td>
<td>United nations Research Institute for social Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
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1 Introduction

Land acquisitions by foreign investors for agricultural purposes have increased rapidly in the last few years, particularly in countries in the Global South. This recent phenomenon, often referred to as ‘land grabbing’ (for a definition of this term, see the International Land Coalition (ILC) 2011), is currently the subject of intense research and debate (see for example the numerous special issues in the *Journal of Peasant Studies* 2011 & 2012; the conference papers of the LDPI Global Land Grabbing Conferences I & II in Sussex 2011 and Cornell 2012; the *Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project*: Anseeuw et al. 2012a; several reports by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED): e.g. Cotula et al. 2009; Cotula & Vermeulen 2009; Cotula 2011; several reports by the Oakland Institute: e.g. Daniel & Mittal 2009; Oakland Institute 2011a; 2011b).

Tanzania might be among the top ten countries worldwide in terms of the amount of land handed over to foreign investors (Anseeuw et al. 2012b). Investors from all over the world have expressed their intention to obtain long-term leases for several thousand hectares of land, or have already done so. The current rise in interest in Tanzania's land and related concerns about its consequences for local people and the environment are broadly discussed, not only among academia (e.g. Mwamila et al. 2009; Sosovele 2010; Mshandete 2011; Oakland Institute 2011a; Locher 2011; Hultman et al. 2012; Neville & Dauvergne 2012; Havnvik et al. 2012; Nelson et al. 2012) and advocacy groups (e.g. Haki Ardhi/LARRRI, TNRF, Oxfam, ActionAid, WWF Tanzania, LHRC, LEAT, the platform Let's Talk Land), but recently also in Tanzanian political circles. A private motion handed in by Member of Parliament Halima Mdee in November 2012 allegedly caused a hot debate in Parliament (Luhwago 2012a). The motion asked that Parliament direct the government to suspend the allocation of land to foreign investors. It further demanded the government to collect and provide up-to-date information on the amount of land handed over to foreign investors. In the view of Mdee, the government currently does not have such an overview on land deals. Proving Mdee’s point, the Minister of Lands and Human Settlements Development declared that the government would thoroughly assess the situation and provide the requested data by April 2013 (Luhwago 2012b). According to media reports (Kiishweko 2012a& 2012b), the growing attention to land deals and recognition of related concerns is further shown in the government’s announcement of a government regulation establishing a ceiling on the amount of land, which a single investor can acquire from 2013 forward.

While the policy debate on the potential positive and negative consequences of foreign (and domestic) land acquisitions and their appropriateness and acceptability is going on globally, the question of reliable data on the phenomenon remains. ‘Land grabbing’ by its nature is dynamic and thus difficult to grasp continuously. Its exploration is further hindered by non-transparent practices on the part of the investors and the reluctance of involved parties, often including the host governments, to share information (GRAIN 2010; Cotula 2011; Cotula 2012). Also in Tanzania, data is not easily available and often not clear-cut (TNRF/REPOA/IIED 2012; Mwami & Kamata 2011; authors’ experiences). However, as we argue in this paper, researchers not only face challenges in getting data, but sometimes also apply slightly questionable methods when documenting and reproducing existing data.

The resulting lack of clear data is reflected, for example, in the Land Matrix, the recent online global data base provided by: the Centre for Development and Environment (CDE); the Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique (CIRAD); the German Institute of Global Areas Studies (GIGA); the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); and the International Land Coalition (ILC) on the Land Portal (www.landportal.info/landmatrix; see also Anseeuw et al. 2012b). Even among the data that are classified as verified and reliable, we were able to find a land deal of a company that no longer exists (Svensk Etanolkemi AB, SEKAB) and a land deal that is reported twice under two different names (AGRICA, formerly InfEnergy Co. Ltd). We also noted the absence of deals which, according to our data, are active (such as EcoEnergy Tanzania and The New Forests Company).

This misleading information is partly the result of a number of companies being driven out of business (particularly biofuel investments) and also partly due to companies being sold to new owners (see also...
chapter 4.6). However, it is also related to flaws in data documentation and reproduction. These flaws contribute to a blurred picture of (part of) the land deal situation in Tanzania, and thus provide an inadequate basis for related political decisions and social actions and a misleading starting point for new research projects.

1.1 Scope and purpose of this study
This study has two aims, namely to stimulate consideration of appropriate data reproduction on the land grabbing phenomenon and to contribute to a fuller picture of the recent land deal situation in Tanzania.

The focus lies on land leases by foreign investors with the purpose of agricultural production, be it for food or biofuels, and on forestry plantations for timber and carbon credit trading. Deals for mineral extraction, conservation, and tourism are not included. Like in the Land Matrix (Anseeuw et al. 2012b), deals below 200ha are not considered. Deals that involve exclusively domestic investors were not our initial focus; however, as we received respective data during our recent fieldwork, we present some limited information on domestic land deals as well.

In the following section we provide insights into the challenges of gaining information on land deals in Tanzania, as experienced by ourselves and other authors. We then illustrate some of the flaws in the use of data so far, with examples in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we give an updated overview of foreign land deals in Tanzania as of December 2012. The overview is based on a careful review of existing literature (for which we also provide an annotated reference list in Chapter 6.2) and on our own fieldwork between 2009 and 2013. The overview does not claim to be complete, but provides a traceable set of data for active and inactive or cancelled land deal projects. In doing so the overview serves as a transparent basis both for future research¹ and for much-needed policy debates and decisions. We conclude the study with some thoughts regarding the overview on land deals in Tanzania in particular (in Chapter 4.6) and the relevance of careful data reproduction in general (in Chapter 5).

2 The challenges of data collection on foreign land deals in Tanzania
Mdee’s parliamentary motion, implying that the government currently has no clear overview on such land deals, mirrors the view held by the authors (field research by Sulle in 2008, 2009, 2011 & 2012 and by Locher in 2010 & 2011) and by other researchers (Oakland Institute 2011:16; HAKIARDHI forthcoming). In Tanzania, different institutions at different levels of government are involved in the land acquisition process, but there is no coordinated storage or exchange of data. In some cases we may have experienced limited cooperation on part of our interviewees. However, in many cases it appeared that officials were willing to help, but they themselves did not have a full understanding of the situation. When asked for data, representatives of national government offices either referred to each other or told us blankly that we should contact district offices, as accurate information would be available only there. This situation might be partly explained by a large gap in employment in the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development, as attested by the latest Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report (FAO 2012) and by the fact that the ‘Central Land Registry still operates largely as a paper-based system’ (ibid.:76).

The land acquisition process is complex and lengthy, as non-citizens are not allowed to acquire land from villages (which falls under the category of Village Land) directly. A non-citizen investor can either obtain derivative land rights from the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) (which is rarely the case due to the limited scope of the TIC land bank) or granted rights of occupancy by the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements

¹ The motivation for this study came during a workshop where Locher realised that other scholars starting a research project in Tanzania had spent considerable time and resources to gain an understanding of the status of certain land investment projects in Tanzania in order to choose their case studies. Locher could have provided most of this information based on her own fieldwork and literature review. This unreasonable waste of academic resources and time on such a burning issue has motivated Locher and Sulle to pursue this publication.
Development, usually after the land has been transferred from the category of Village Land to the category of General Land (Makwarimba & Ngowi 2012; LEAT 2011; Isaksson & Sigte 2009; Sulle & Nelson 2009).

The complex process contributes to the challenges of gaining an up-to-date understanding of land deals in the country. It can be assumed that the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development has relevant data on holders of derivative rights and rights of occupancy (although we could not access such data). However, the long process for obtaining such titles does not seem to be documented in a central institution. While the TIC is supposed to guide and support any investor in his or her land acquisition process, it cannot obligate investors to approach them. It is thus not aware of all on-going investment processes, as many investors seem to approach district or village authorities without contacting the TIC beforehand. An example is the case of the New Forests Company, which allegedly became active in the Kilolo District through the district’s Member of Parliament (interviews with district land official and several village leaders in 2011 by Locher). Yet, it would be important to know about investments in their early stages — not only for the sake of having the whole picture, but also because it seems to be a common practice among investors to start activities on their land before completing all the paperwork (interviews with TIC and district land officials by Locher in 2010 & 2011; several examples of such projects, see Table 1). BioShape in Kilwa for example went ahead with logging natural forest found in the land allocated to it before securing a timber-harvesting license from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Songela & Maclean 2008; Sulle & Nelson 2009).

As a result of this lack of transparent and easily available data, many researchers addressing land grabbing in Tanzania try to gain a first-hand understanding. However, not only is it challenging to collect data in this area but also, as argued below, existing data are sometimes reproduced in questionable ways.

3 Flaws in the documentation and reproduction of data

Several flaws can be found in existing publications on land deals in Tanzania, both related to the documentation of primary data and to their reproduction. While we can only speculate regarding the reasons for these (at least for academic purposes) unusual practices, this study mainly focuses on identifying their implications. In the following we list different types of flaws as well as their potential consequences and illustrate them with examples. Though we quote existing reports for the purpose of illustrating our critical observations, we do not intend to criticise individual authors. Rather we seek to demonstrate by example consequences of lax standards in reporting land deals that seem to have been established over the last few years.

3.1 Imprecise indication of status of projects and stage of land acquisitions

The data that is provided is often not very specific in terms of the stage of a land acquisition project. Some datasets do not even distinguish between announced plans and initiated or completed land deals (e.g. the Land Matrix; GRAIN 2008), while others merely give indications such as ‘planned’, ‘signed’ or ‘implemented’ (e.g. in Görgen et al. 2009; Friis & Reenberg 2010). However, without a detailed description this information is unhelpful in understanding the actual status of a project. For example, investors might ‘sign’ an expression of interest (e.g. in village meeting minutes) with village leaders and start to plant their crops (‘implemented’), before having finalised the formal land acquisition process, thus not having any rights to this land according to state law.

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2 The documented flaws and unusual practices might be partly ascribed to the challenges of getting information or related to the non-transparent nature of the ‘land grabbing’ phenomenon itself (see Chapter 2). Another reason might be convenience, as it is quite time-consuming to report details of the deals and data sources as precisely as we propose. Further, it might also be related to the non-academic nature of many reports, which are mainly produced by representatives of NGOs or development agencies, probably under considerable time pressure and with a significant preference for presenting their findings in pleasant readability. These reports often have the advantage of being published quickly and reaching a broad audience — an important point in this fast moving phenomenon (which in our opinion requires policy decisions urgently).

3 This example highlights the challenges of presenting a complex phenomenon in a generalised way with summarised short text, as is often done in reports with inventories of land deals included for the sake of providing at least some overview.
One can argue that it is not relevant to distinguish between the different stages of a project when intending to present the investors' interest in Tanzanian land. However, when it comes to implications of land deals it makes a big difference whether the land deal was just announced and withdrawn before taking any action on the ground or whether it is partly or fully realised. The precise information regarding the stage of a project can also be relevant for future reports. However, it is often difficult to gain such specific information (as highlighted in Chapter 2). While this first flaw is related to the content of the given dataset, the two following issues focus instead on scholarly practices of data use.

3.2 Documentation of data: Aggregated and thus inaccurate
The most common and significant flaw is related to the documentation of data. While it is an established standard in academic literature to clearly and precisely provide the sources for presented data, in literature tackling the land grabbing phenomenon it seems to have become common practice to provide sources for information regarding land deals in an aggregated and somewhat incomplete way. Information on different land deals is usually presented by listing investors either in a table or in small paragraphs. The sources for the data are then given as a whole for the total compilation, either at the bottom of the table or in the methodology (or another similar) chapter. The sources usually comprise both empirical data collected by the authors from several sources as well as data from other literature. An example of such a table is provided in a (otherwise highly appreciated) publication by the Oakland Institute (2011a), where the sources given at the bottom of the table include fieldwork, three government institutions and four earlier publications (other examples are provided in Görgen et al. 2009; Mwamila et al. 2009; Sulle & Nelson 2009; Songela & Maclean 2008; Kashaigili & Nzunda 2010). Finally, the recent publication by the FAO (2012) provides a table with partially outdated information on the ‘status of recent investments’ with the indication of sources as weak as follows: ‘Compiled by authors from various sources’ (FAO 2012:77).

The practice of giving sources only in an aggregated form has consequences. It makes the source of information and details regarding individual land deals untraceable. As a result of this, it is difficult to judge the data’s quality. For example, looking at such a table, it is impossible to know whether information on a given deal is recent and confirmed by the authors or whether it is based on other sources, which may be older or considered less reliable. It is also not possible to follow up the development of a land deal project by approaching the same source of information or to triangulate the data by deliberately choosing a different source (as opposed to choosing it by chance, where there is the risk that one could approach the same source again). Another potential consequence of this practice is described in the following section.

3.3 Reproduction of data: Incomplete and inaccurate quotation
Publications that rely on data from earlier compilations (as described above) often refer only to the authors of that compilation and omit the primary data sources. Examples include publications from the GTZ (Görgen et al. 2009), Kashaigili and Nzunda (2010) and the Oakland Institute (2011a). All of them rely to a certain extent on the IIED report of Sulle and Nelson from 20094 and quote it accordingly, but they do not acknowledge the original sources of data which Sulle and Nelson give in their compilation, namely own fieldwork and information from three other publications, including Kamanga (2008). Also Sulle and Nelson applied this practice: they quoted Kamanga (2008) and others in their table, but did not provide the latter's sources of information. For readers of the above-mentioned later publications (such as the GTZ report), it thus appears that Sulle and Nelson have collected all the given data, while it stems in fact from several sources, including the sources used by Kamanga. Besides issues related to acknowledging intellectual property, another consequence is that incorrect attribution could imply that certain data provided are seemingly newer than they are. In the examples given above, the data are apparently from the 2009 IIED publication, while some of them are in reality from the three 2008 reports, on which Sulle and Nelson rely.

4Görgen et al. (2009) do not explicitly refer to Sulle and Nelson (2009), but to Cotula et al. (2009), whose data for Tanzania are based on the data published in Sulle and Nelson (2009).
(Kamanga 2008; Songela & Maclean 2008; Kulindwa 2008). Such a time difference, though only one or two years, is relevant in the fast moving land grabbing phenomenon.

Another consequence is related to the assumed quality of published sources. When giving the source of information in a summarised way, it is difficult or impossible for the reader to judge the quality of the underlying data. Later publications might quote sources that seem reliable (for example when quoting the GTZ report by Görgen et al. 2009, which is to a large extent based on media articles), while they might be based mainly on weak data. The reader is not provided the chance to judge for him or herself, unless he or she is able and willing to scrutinise the quoted publications.

3.4 Misleading information: ‘Virtual survival of dead deals’ and deals reported twice in the same compilation

As elaborated in chapter 2, it is difficult to grasp a dynamic and non-transparent phenomenon such as land grabbing in an accurate way. To a certain degree, misleading data might be unavoidable. However, the occurrence of such data might be aggravated by rough summary documentation of land deal projects in the country. Some examples of misleading information, like continued reporting of ceased or aborted deals and double reporting, are given in the following section.

The Oakland Institute publication (2011a:18) lists in its compilation the Korean investor KRC as having acquired 15 000ha of land in Rufiji\(^1\) (in accordance with respective announcements in the media: TanzanianInvest 2009; Ng’wanakilala 2010; Rugonzibwa 2010). However, according to recent information from a RUBADA\(^6\) official obtained by Sulle in January 2013, the project had been based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) only, not involving land acquisition. The MoU expired in August 2012 before the company began any operations aside from conducting a feasibility study. RUBADA is currently looking for a new investor for this area (RUBADA official, personal communication by Sulle in 2013).

Friis and Reenberg (2010), Kaarhus et al. (2010) and FAO (2012) list the Dutch company BioShape, which ceased its activities in Tanzania in 2009 and went bankrupt in 2010 (Chachte & Baha 2010; Valentino 2011). Of course, reporting the deal is very much justified, as there had been a land acquisition process and implications on the ground are still very relevant. However, the way that the case is reported should not pretend that the company is still active.

The Oakland Institute (2011a), probably referring to a figure obtained in Kaarhus et al. (2010), lists the Swedish company EcoEnergy (formally SEKAB) as active in a land acquisition process for 200 000ha in Rufiji District while according to indications from our sources (Rufiji District Natural Resources Officer interviewed by Sulle in November 2012; company’s manager interviewed by Locher in 2010; EcoEnergy website in 2013), the company has been focusing on developing its land plots in Bagamoyo since around 2010, and there do not seem to be more plans for securing land in Rufiji District so far. In addition, news on the United nations Research Institute for social Development (UNRISD) website in November 2011 stated that ‘SEKAB has already planted 20 000ha in Tanzania’s coastal region and has plans to expand this to 400 000ha’ (Chinweze et al. 2011). The FAO publication of 2012 also mentions that SEKAB requested 250 000ha–500 000ha. This was after the company earlier named ‘SEKAB Bioenergy Tanzania Ltd’ had ceased to exist and the activities had been handed over to EcoEnergy in October 2009. EcoEnergy founded the new company ‘Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Ltd’ in 2010 (EcoEnergy website; BREALA). Further, according to our sources (see above), the project has planted a maximum of around 8 000ha so far, if at all (not 20 000ha). In Bagamoyo, the company has a maximum of about 8 000ha suitable for sugarcane plantation and the rest of the 12 000ha will remain a buffer zone (district official interview by Sulle 2012).

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1 In the Oakland Institute report (2011a) the KRC is named Korean Rural Development Cooperation, deviant from other sources that name it Korean Rural Community Cooperation. The publication provides some detailed and more precise information about the investor’s plans in a separate box on page 21; however, the information in the table suggests that said land is already acquired.

6RUBADA (Rufiji Basin Development Authority) is a statutory organ, established in 1975, that manages several plots of land in the Rufiji Basin (Mwami and Kamata 2011:18).
There are deals reported twice under two different names: the Land Matrix reports the InfEnergy Company Ltd as a separate company from AGRICA while the first is the earlier name for the latter (in both cases the local subsidiary is Kilombero Plantations Limited). In principle, InfEnergy changed its business plan, and thus its name, from oil palm for biodiesel production to rice production for local and international markets (Chachage 2012). Further, a sorghum project in the coastal area is sometimes referred to as an investment of the CAMS Group (e.g. Land Matrix 2012; Oakland Institute 2011a) and sometimes as a project of the Tanzanian subsidiary CMC Agriculture Bio-energy Tanzania (Bengesi et al. 2009; Mwamila et al. 2009).

4 Land deals in Tanzania

4.1 Basis for the updated information provided in the tables

The basis of the following compilations is the annotated reference list (which can be found in Chapter 6.2). The reference list documents the type of data and the sources of that data given in the literature. For our compilations, to the best of our knowledge (see next section), we used primary data only. We define these as data collected by an author or authors based on materials from involved government offices (e.g. table on companies involved in biofuels by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, provided in Kaarhus et al. 2010) or information from interviews with involved government officials, local key persons or representatives of the investing company, or direct observations in the field. Secondary data (data from reports quoting other publications) are not included in our tables. As a consequence, for example, the well-known IIED publication by Cotula et al. (2009) is not used for our compilations, as its information on Tanzania is fully based on an unpublished study by Sulle, commissioned by IIED, which was soon after released by Sulle and Nelson (2009) as an IIED report.

As mentioned in chapter 3.3, the compilations of data in other publications do not allow the reader to distinguish the primary data from the secondary data easily (looking at the tables alone). In many cases it is possible though to draw assumptions about the primary data from the chapters on methodology (e.g. by considering the districts visited by authors). We generally also assumed that data from presented case studies were primary data. Further, we tried to identify the original data by filling in our tables in chronological order of publication dates (or dates of data collection), starting with the oldest publications. We could thus see which information provided by a more recent publication was new and which information seemed to be copied from an older source. However, we cannot fully guarantee that we acknowledged all original (or reconfirmed) data as such, or that we did not consider some secondary data as original data due to unclear indication.

In the last column of our tables, we give the precise source of data for each land deal. For detailed information in the other columns, we usually give the source of information in a short version in brackets. This is particularly interesting in the case of contradictions. With this procedure, though laborious and less smooth to read, we make sure that the given information is traceable.

The stage of a land deal, if known, is indicated with the size of the land deal. Unfortunately, it is often only vague or not available at all. Different from other compilations, we have included an additional column with information on the earlier status of the land at question. In many cases clear information is absent; we usually assumed it to be Village Land when the sources indicated that the land was acquired from villages. However, this is not confirmed and detailed data on whether the land was used by individuals, commonly, or kept as a reserve is often missing. The column ‘Status, business model, additional information’ provides any further information, where suitable, in chronological order.

We have listed the land deals according to investors' names in alphabetical order. In cases of subsidiary and sister companies or variable names of the investing company we refer to the main entry in the respective place in the alphabet.
### 4.2 Information on foreign land deals in Tanzania

#### Table 1: Deals by foreign investors and joint ventures by Tanzanians and foreigners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
<th>Location (district)</th>
<th>Product and purpose</th>
<th>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</th>
<th>Land status before acquisition</th>
<th>Status, business model, additional information</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>30 Degree East Partnership between Mauritian (holding 90%) and Tanzanian investor (10%) <strong>Formally known as Sun Biofuels</strong> owned by an investor from the UK</td>
<td>Kisarawe</td>
<td>Jatropha for vegetable oil and biodiesel</td>
<td>8 211ha (derivative right: Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009; Oakland Institute 2011a)</td>
<td>Village lands from 10 villages (LEAT 2011)</td>
<td>The following information is for the earlier company Sun Biofuels: Plan to create 5 000 jobs (Bengesi et al. 2009; Songela &amp; Maclean 2008) Compensation intended: just over 35 000 TSh/ha (Songela &amp; Maclean 2008)</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (field visits in 2008)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>11 226ha (village negotiations, Songela &amp; Maclean 2008)</td>
<td>11 villages (Theting &amp; Brekke 2010; Oakland Institute 2011a)</td>
<td>Muhaga village provided 1 500ha of their total 5 000ha to the company (Theting &amp; Brekke 2010)</td>
<td>Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009 (Sulle field visit March 2009)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8 000ha (FAO 2010; Kashaigili &amp; Nzunda 2010)</td>
<td>Muhaga village provided their total 8 000ha of land at a lease of 99 years. Work commenced on the clearing of land in June 2009 in preparation for planting. The company planted the first 600ha of jatropha in November 2009. Conflicts about compensation; salary above minimum wage, but questionable working conditions (Theting &amp; Brekke 2010)</td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9 000ha (granted, final stage of acquisition, Bengesi et al. 2009; Mwamila et al. 2009)</td>
<td>Procedures of land acquisition not adhered to, manipulation; employment provided; access to land and water resources denied (LEAT 2011)</td>
<td>The company went bankrupt in early 2012. It has laid off overnight about 750 workers and failed to fulfil its socio-economic promises. The latter wasn’t implemented until its collapse in 2011 (HAKIARDHI forthcoming)</td>
<td>FAO 2010 (source unclear)</td>
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<td>Requested: 18 000ha (Songela &amp; Maclean 2008, FAO 2010, Oakland Institute 2011a)</td>
<td>Jatropha plantation and envisioned out-grower scheme. The latter wasn’t implemented until its collapse in 2011 (HAKIARDHI forthcoming)</td>
<td>The company went bankrupt in early 2012. It has laid off overnight about 750 workers and failed to fulfil its socio-economic promises. The latter wasn’t implemented until its collapse in 2011 (HAKIARDHI forthcoming)</td>
<td>Kashaigili &amp; Nzunda 2010 (fieldwork)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50 000ha (Bengesi et al. 2009, Mwamila et al. 2009)</td>
<td>Procedures of land acquisition not adhered to, manipulation; employment provided; access to land and water resources denied (LEAT 2011)</td>
<td>The company went bankrupt in early 2012. It has laid off overnight about 750 workers and failed to fulfil its socio-economic promises. The latter wasn’t implemented until its collapse in 2011 (HAKIARDHI forthcoming)</td>
<td>Theting &amp; Brekke 2010 (fieldwork, probably in April 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 **Sources** (for all tables): Fieldwork by the authors of this study (see column ‘Sources of information’) and several publications providing primary data (see column ‘Sources of information’ for short indication and the annotated reference list in Chapter 6.2 for the detailed indication). **Please note:** Information is given as per December 2012, with the exception of some online sources (consulted in early 2013) and interviews by Locher on CAMS Agri-Energy Tanzania, New Forests Company and Tanga Forests in February 2013. **Numbering** (first column) does not count every entry, but each project (i.e. projects that were sold and/or changed their name are counted only once). Projects of the same company, located in different districts, are usually counted as one, with the exception of the two projects of SEKAB Bioenergy Tanzania / Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Ltd (project in Bagamoyo ongoing, in Rufiji aborted).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Africa Biofuel &amp; Emission Reduction Company (Tanzania) Ltd (Tanzanian, USA)</td>
<td>Biharamulo</td>
<td>Croton megalocarpus (planned)</td>
<td>60 000ha (Kamanga 2008) 60 000ha (Kamanga 2008) Planned: 20 000ha (Songela &amp; Maclean 2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial plan: plantation and collaboration with independent growers (providing them with education and technical support); but lack of funds, not operational, probably abandoned plans (Songela &amp; Maclean 2008) In 2008, the company won the World Bank Development Marketplace Award, a competitive grant program for innovative, early stage development projects (DM 2008) Acquisition under process, contracts expected in 2010 (Locher 2010a) According to a government official, the company was stopped by the Vice-President Office due to a land-related issue (Locher 2010b) TIC officials have no recent information about this company (Sulle 2012) The company’s website’s latest news is dated Nov 2011; no clear information about status in Tanzania (ABEA website) Two mail requests in Nov and Dec 2012 to the Managing Director (by Locher) were not replied. Registered in BREA as incorporated on 11 Aug 2006</td>
<td>The Guardian 2011 Havnevik et al. 2012 (fieldwork) HAKIARDHI forthcoming Kamanga 2008 (field research, data from MEM, MAFS) Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (probably based on interviews with government officials) Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010) Locher 2010a (mail contact with company’s Managing Director Christine Adamow 30 April 2010) Locher 2010b (interview with Commissioner of Ministry of Energy and Minerals in July 2012) Sulle 2012 (interview with TIC officials, Dec 2012) Development Marketplace (DM) 2008 Wilma 2006 (investor’s brochure)</td>
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<td>No.</td>
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<td>Location (district)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>AgriSol Energy Tanzania (Tanzanian, USA, Dubai)</td>
<td>Mpanda (Baha 2011)</td>
<td>Corn, sorghum, soybeans, sugarcane, poultry, cattle, ethanol (Oakland Institute 2011a)</td>
<td>acquisition still under process (Oakland Institute 2011a)</td>
<td>Village land other?</td>
<td>The company plans to operate plantations in the proposed area of which it has signed a MoU with the Mpanda District Council (OI 2011b)</td>
<td>Oakland Institute 2011a and 2011b (field visit Dec 2010, phone interviews 2011, company's documents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint venture between Serengeti Advisers Ltd (Dar es Salaam) and the AgriSol Energy LLC/group (IOWA based)(company's website; OI 2011b)</td>
<td>Kigoma, Rukwa (Oakland Institute 2011a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>requested: 325 117ha (Oakland Institute 2011a/b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The company also plans to develop an out-grower scheme in which farmers will have access to quality agricultural inputs (fertiliser, seeds etc.) (Baha 2011; OI 2011b)</td>
<td>Baha 2011 (field visits in Mpanda, Rukwa region, interviews with members and leaders of the village government in Mpanda)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Key partner: Pharos Global Agricultural Fund, managed by Pharos Financial Group, Dubai-based (OI 2011b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planned to develop in 2012: 10 000ha in Lugufu and 3 250ha in Basanza Village (Baha 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td>AgriSol Energy Tanzania owns 25% shares and it has teamed up with the Serengeti Advisors to ensure the company access the land from the Mpanda District Council (Baha 2011)</td>
<td>Ruhie 2012 (field visit June 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Agro-Forest Plantations Ltd (Egyptian)</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Sugar cane for sugar processing for domestic and Egyptian market (El Agamy 2012)</td>
<td>6 895ha (DAO 2012)</td>
<td>Village Land (Mohoro, Chumbi A, B, C and Ruma Villages)</td>
<td>Registered under TIC 1 Dec 2011; will start December 2014 (DAO 2012)</td>
<td>DAO 2012 (Document by District Agricultural Officer received by Sulle in Dec 2012)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>planned to have shareholders from Egypt and Tanzania (El Agamy 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Requested: 10 000ha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of sugar plant scheduled for 2014 (Msonsa 2012; El Agamy 2012)</td>
<td>RUBADA 2012 (document by RUBADA received by Sulle in Dec 2012)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>P.O. Box 20618 DSM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Available: 8 000ha (RUBADA 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Promise improved roads, construction of a health centre and schools (Msonsa 2012)</td>
<td>El Agamy 2012 (Zawya article)</td>
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<td>project of Egyptian African Company (EAC)</td>
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<td>‘The firm plantations will cover about 500ha with the capacity of producing over 157 000T of sugarcane annually. At the same time people from the seven surrounding villages are being trained on sugarcane growing’ (project coordinator Mr Kiondo Mahanyu in Msonsa 2012)</td>
<td>Msonsa 2012 (The Citizen article)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Arkadia Ltd (Italian)</td>
<td>Mkinga</td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td>approved by the District: 500ha (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>Villa land with little direct use (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>Mkinga district asked investor to pay for seven village land use plans; after the planning, the seven villages wanted to give only totally 9 000ha to Arkadia and some other area to another interested investor; Arkadia seemed to lose interest (Locher 2010)</td>
<td>Locher 2010 (interview with Catherine Makudi, National Land Use Planning Commission, Aug 2010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Box 5468, Tanga</td>
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<td></td>
<td>registered at Ministry: 25 000ha (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>‘barren land’ (Locher 2011)</td>
<td>Document of Arkadia from Dec 2008 (Locher 2011b) states: — intention of leasing 69 000ha — initially planning to use 25 000ha–35 000ha — villages allegedly authorised 75 000ha — Arkadia ready to start as soon as necessary authorisation is provided — promise of 4 000 long term contract employees and social infrastructure</td>
<td>Locher 2011a (interview with Catherine Makudi, National Land Use Planning Commission, Jan 2011)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arkadia Limited</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Planned in 2010: 25 000ha (Locher 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The project remains controversial as the district officials were unaware on what basis the company secured the 25 000ha it registered at the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>Locher 2011b (interview with George Joseph Miringay, Town Planner Mkinga, May 2011; insight document by Arkadia to district, dated Dec 2008)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>159 Rochester Road Rochester ME1 3SF</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Allegedly agreed by villages in 2008: 75 000ha (Locher 2011b)</td>
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<td>Sulle 2012 (interview with the District Land and Natural Resources Officer, Dec 2012)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.rkdia.co.uk/">www.rkdia.co.uk/</a></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(no indication of the land deal project in Tanzania)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Ltd also known as EcoEnergy Tanzania Ltd (Swedish)</td>
<td>Bagamoyo</td>
<td>Sugar cane for sugar, ethanol; and electricity, all for domestic market (EcoEnergy 2012)</td>
<td>200ha (Songela &amp; Maclean 2008)</td>
<td>Zanzibar People’s Ranch (RAZABA/TIC, gov.) (Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009; Locher 2009)</td>
<td>The company changed its name and ownership. Note: The first part of the information is for SEKAB Bioenergy Tanzania</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (field visits in 2008)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Complex ownership, since Oct 2009: EcoEnergy Bagamoyo Ltd is 100% owned by Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania which in turn is owned 93.5% by EcoEnergy Africa AB, 5% by Tanzanian Petroleum Development Company (TPDC) and 1.5% by Community Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22 500ha(granted by TIC; Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009)</td>
<td>200ha for cane seed production leased from prisons (in 2008, Songela &amp; Maclean)</td>
<td>22000ha granted by TIC, derivative rights under process (Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009); but according to Manager Bergfors until Nov 2009 derivative rights had been provided for only 8000ha (Locher 2009)</td>
<td>Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009 (personal interviews with company officials in Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo, March 2009)</td>
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<td>22 000ha + 500ha (Bengesi et al. 2009, Oakland Institute 2011)</td>
<td>14 households and a number of pastoralists displaced and compensated (Songela &amp; Maclean)</td>
<td>Earlier vision (Locher 2010): — Out-growers in block farm model: envisaged 6000ha</td>
<td>Locher 2009 &amp; 2010 (meetings with Managing Director Bergfors Nov 2009 &amp; Jul 2010)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>22 2400ha? (Mwamila et al. 2009:8 &amp; 33)</td>
<td>Some people using and living on the land</td>
<td>In 2009 funding problems, but during 2010 new investors found to continue project in Bagamoyo (Locher 2010; company’s website)</td>
<td>FAO 2010 (source unclear)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 000ha(derivative rights, Locher 2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SEKAB BioEnergy Tanzania has not yet started</td>
<td>Mwamila et al. 2009 (fieldwork Jul/Aug 2009)</td>
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<td>Benges et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food)</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Investor (nationality, contact details)</td>
<td>Location (district)</td>
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<td>Corporation Ltd (CFC). EcoEnergy Africa AB is owned by EcoDevelopment in Europe AB; CFC is owned by three Tanzanians. (company's website)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22 000ha + 200ha (allocated by central gov. in 2008 and by Kigongoni Prison, respectively, Chachage 2010)</td>
<td>(EcoEnergy website 2012, undated African Development Bank (AfDB) report)</td>
<td>the real production despite the acquired land; Seed cane farm planted and a reservoir for irrigation water constructed (Kashaigili &amp; Nzunda 2010)</td>
<td>Security and Cooperatives) Chachage 2010 (based on SEKAB BioEnergy Tanzania report 2008 and a Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) study of Opportuna Kweka 2010, among others)</td>
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<td>20 000ha (FAO 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seed cane farm at the prison planted, plan to move onto the ranch in 2011; plans to employ 15 000 workers (Oakland Institute 2011)</td>
<td>Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>24 000ha</td>
<td></td>
<td>HAKIARDHI forthcoming: Officially offered RAZABA ranch in 2008 by the GoT with 99 years lease; new model for land deal: ‘equity in exchange for land’ (see also company’s statement below); planned 7800ha sugar plantation and 3 000ha out-growers. Also undertaking research on drip irrigation on 200ha in Bagamoyo prison farm.</td>
<td>Kashaigili &amp; Nzunda 2010 (fieldwork)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Requested: 24 500ha (Kaarhus et al. 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td>HAKIARDHI forthcoming: Officially offered RAZABA ranch in 2008 by the GoT with 99 years lease; new model for land deal: ‘equity in exchange for land’ (see also company’s statement below); planned 7800ha sugar plantation and 3 000ha out-growers. Also undertaking research on drip irrigation on 200ha in Bagamoyo prison farm.</td>
<td>Company’s website (accessed 30.01.2013); Company's website: <a href="http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/">www.ecoenergy.co.tz/</a> <a href="http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/faq/project-faq/">www.ecoenergy.co.tz/faq/project-faq/</a> (accessed 30.01.2013)</td>
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<td>Planned 28 000ha Suitable 8 000ha only (Sulle 2012)</td>
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<td>Company’s website (accessed 30.01.2013); Envisaged business model: — Own farm (planned 7 800ha or 8 000ha) — out-growers’ programme to be fully realised by 2018 (app. 3 000ha, estimated to directly involve approximately 1 500 families) — sugar cane processing plant for flexible production of ethanol/sugar plus cogeneration of electric power (to be used by end 2014) &quot;Under the current agreement, EcoEnergy will obtain a 99 year lease and free access to the land from the Government of Tanzania in exchange for a 25% ownership interest in the project company and a membership of the board of directors (... the Tanzanian</td>
<td>Available on website: AfDB Executive Summary of the Resettlement Action Plan, no date, probably Sep 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Investor (nationality, contact details)</td>
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<td>37 000ha (FAO 2010)</td>
<td>Land from four villages, small part occupied; in Mavuji village total 17 000ha provided, formerly communal and reserved land (LEAT 2011)</td>
<td>Probably new owner (see last comment); the following information is about the initial project and owner:</td>
<td>- Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (field visits in 2008) - Gordon-Maclean et al. 2008 - Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010) - Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009 (field visit) - LEAT 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011) - Sulle 2011 (field visits and interviews with villagers and district officials, August 2011) - FAO 2010 (source unclear) - Media reports: Simbeye 2010 (Daily News) Simbeye 2011 (Daily News) - Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) - Chachage &amp; Baha 2010 (fieldwork in May/June 2010) - Valentino 2011 (media article)</td>
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<td>80 000ha (Bengesi et al. 2009)</td>
<td>Land from four villages, small part occupied; in Mavuji village total 17 000ha provided, formerly communal and reserved land (LEAT 2011)</td>
<td>Probably new owner (see last comment); the following information is about the initial project and owner:</td>
<td>- Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (field visits in 2008) - Gordon-Maclean et al. 2008 - Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010) - Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009 (field visit) - LEAT 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011) - Sulle 2011 (field visits and interviews with villagers and district officials, August 2011) - FAO 2010 (source unclear) - Media reports: Simbeye 2010 (Daily News) Simbeye 2011 (Daily News) - Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) - Chachage &amp; Baha 2010 (fieldwork in May/June 2010) - Valentino 2011 (media article)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>82 000ha (Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009)</td>
<td>Land from four villages, small part occupied; in Mavuji village total 17 000ha provided, formerly communal and reserved land (LEAT 2011)</td>
<td>Probably new owner (see last comment); the following information is about the initial project and owner:</td>
<td>- Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (field visits in 2008) - Gordon-Maclean et al. 2008 - Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010) - Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009 (field visit) - LEAT 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011) - Sulle 2011 (field visits and interviews with villagers and district officials, August 2011) - FAO 2010 (source unclear) - Media reports: Simbeye 2010 (Daily News) Simbeye 2011 (Daily News) - Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) - Chachage &amp; Baha 2010 (fieldwork in May/June 2010) - Valentino 2011 (media article)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Bio-energy Tanzania Ltd (Tanzanian and Canadian) earlier name (but same owners): Trinity Consultants Bioenergy Tz Ltd</td>
<td>Bagamoyo</td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td>16 000ha (surveying)</td>
<td>Village lands (Vigwaza Kidogozero villages)</td>
<td>Company has not yet started the real production despite the acquired land, busy surveying and to be granted land after process is complete. (Kashaigili &amp; Nzunda 2010) Location: Vigwaza Kidogozero But still facing land conflict as the original village was divided into two villages, and now the new village does not accept its land being taken by the investor (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>Mwamila et al. (2009) Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, fieldwork) Kashaigili &amp; Nzunda 2010 (fieldwork) Oakland Institute 2011 (fieldwork Dec 2010) Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLNRO, Nov 2012)</td>
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|     |                                       |                     |                     | 18 000 ha (planning to acquire in 2011, in other area than earlier targeted land; Locher 2011) | 2010b)  
According to the CEO, the company had been assigned 208 000ha in Handeni and Bagamoyo (planning to produce 250 Million litres of ethanol and 120mW of power, together with Spanish Abengoa Bioenergy). Due to the financial crisis, the plans were reduced to smaller plants, aiming to produce 20 Million litres on 18 000ha. The new plot was planned to be acquired in another area than the earlier assigned land (at the coast, district unclear) (Locher 2011).  

Produce 240 million litres of ethanol a year from sweet sorghum (Oakland Institute 2011a, exact sources unclear)  

‘In 2009, CAMS acquired exclusive rights for proprietary Advanced Solid State Fermentation (ASSF) technology to produce ethanol and power from Sweet Sorghum. An African pilot project in Tanzania is in its early stages. CAMS is negotiating long-lease of 20 000ha of agricultural land in the Coastal Region to grow sweet sorghum...’ (company's website)  

According to the CEO in February 2013, the company was still in the planning stage in Tanzania (not producing); it focused on its sorghum pilot projects in Uganda and Kenya, where it applies an out-grower model, which is planned to be applied in Tanzania as well. (In Uganda, around 4 000ha of sorghum are planted, whereas around 160ha of the land belongs to the company, the rest belongs to out-growers.) According to the CEO some districts at the coastal line had offered land, but the company refused it due to their preference for an out-grower model (Locher 2013) | Locher 2010b (interview with TIC official, Aug 2010)  
Locher 2011 and 2013 (skype contact with CEO Joannou, Jan 2011 and Feb 2013)  
Oakland Institute 2011a (several sources, exact source unclear, maybe company's own announcement, see Reuters 2008)  
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<td>10</td>
<td>EcoCarbon (French) formerly Diligent (Tanzania) Ltd (Dutch)</td>
<td>Bagamoyo</td>
<td>Jatropha (planned only)</td>
<td>Requested: 75 000ha</td>
<td>Mwalima et al. (2009): not given land yet The company mainly depended on buying jatropha seeds, it used to collect them from out-growers in the regions of Manyara, Arusha, and Singida (Sulle &amp; Nelson 2009) The company planned to extend the production of jatropha in many regions including Bagamoyo but it has never materialised this goal in Bagamoyo (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mwamila et al. 2009 (fieldwork Jul/Aug 2009) Sulle and Nelson 2009 (field visits) Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLNRO, Nov 2012)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Enviro-Fuel Technologies T probably subsidiary of EnviroFuels LLC (American) <a href="http://www.envirofuelslp.com">www.envirofuelslp.com</a> P.O Box 42355, DSM</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biofuels</td>
<td></td>
<td>No further details are available from TIC (Sulle 2012) and web searches Registered at BRELAs incorporated in Sep 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kamanga 2008 (field research, data from MEM, MAFS) Sulle 2012 (meeting with TIC officer Sept 2012)</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Eurotech (Korean) Tel +255 784 751 622</td>
<td>'undecided' (Kaarhus et al. 2010)</td>
<td>Planning to grow 100 000ha of castor oil and Jatropha for biodiesel (Kamanga 2008)</td>
<td>Planned: 10 000ha (Kamanga 2008)</td>
<td>Planning to invest more than US$20 million (Kamanga 2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kamanga 2008 (field interviews) Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010)</td>
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| 14  | **FELISA (Farming for Energy for better Livelihoods in Southern Africa)** (Tanzanian/Belgian)  
Box Kigoma | Kigoma              | Oil palm for biodiesel and/or edible oil for local market | 4,258 ha (but some of it under land dispute in court; Songela & Maclean 2008)  
4,258 ha acquired (Kaarhus et al. 2010)  
100 ha + 4,258 ha (LEAT 2011) requested: around 5,000 ha (Songela & Maclean 2008; Kaarhus et al. 2010) | General land small part occupied (LEAT 2011) | Plantation status in 2008 (Songela & Maclean): nursery (42,000 seedlings); 150 ha plantation, 990 farmers organised, using processing equipment; plan: 5,000 ha own plantation and 5,000 ha planted by out-growers; production of palm oil expected by end of 2009; initial idea: biodiesel for regional energy supply, but due to high price for crude oil decision to sell the latter instead in local market  
Land dispute in court over extra 350 ha obtained from 2 villages; no EIA assessment done (Sulle & Nelson 2009)  
Land acquisition procedures adhered to, with limited participation of locals; employment provided; access to land and water resources denied (LEAT 2011) | Sulle & Nelson 2009 (Sulle field work 2008/09)  
Songela and Maclean 2008 (field visits in 2008)  
Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010)  
LEAT 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011) |
| 15  | **FJS African Starch Development Co. Ltd** (American)  
P.O. Box 34634 DSM | Rufiji              | Cassava for starch production | Requested: 5,000 ha (RUBADA 2012) | Village lands: Nyambili & Nyambunda village | Unknown (DAO 2012)  
Requested: 10 ha for factory at Bungu and 2,500 ha for back up farm at Nyambili & Nyambunda village (RUBADA 2012) | DAO 2012 (document of DAO, received by Sulle in Dec 2012)  
RUBADA 2012 (document received by Sulle in Dec 2012) |
| 16  | **Green Resources Ltd** subsidiary of **Green Resources SA** (Norwegian)  
[www.greenresources.no](http://www.greenresources.no)  
[www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx](http://www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx)  
Financially supported by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank Group | Mufindi             | Forest plantation  
Timber (pine, eucalyptus, teak), saw logs, poles  
energy production  
carbon credits  
timber sale | 20,434 ha ('titled'), company's website, entry undated, seems to be from 2009 | Village Land | Plantations: Idete and Mapanda, trial planting initiated in Kitete and Masagati; Industrial operations at Sao Hill Industries Ltd. (sister company) in Mafinga (Mufindi district); Community forest program; Objectives are ‘carbon storage and to harvest forestry products for sawn timber, utility poles and renewable energy. There is a potential for a future pulp mill or a pellet factory...’ (company’s website)  
Took over government saw mill in Mufindi in the 1990s; a nearby government plantation also provides timber to Green Resources for processing (Locher 2010) | Locher 2010 (interview with Nicodemus Luvanga, Branch Manager Dar es Salaam, Aug 2010)  
Chachage 2010 (based on several other studies and company documents)  
UNEP Risoe Centre 2013 (CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, Jan 2013)  
[www.cdmpipeline.org](http://www.cdmpipeline.org)  
IFC no date (announcement of...)

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8 While Songela and Maclean state that the company has acquired 4,258 ha (in 2008), they write that the company has 4,658 ha own plantation land. We assume it is a writing mistake.
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<td></td>
<td>Green Resources SA is also active in Mozambique, Uganda, Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>mainly domestic, some export (around 8%–10%) to Kenya, Mauritius, Dubai, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Seychelles (Locher 2010)</td>
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<td>Idete: 2 130ha planted until 2009; ‘Out of the 14176ha titled area, 9 010ha are plantable, with 3 498ha set aside for conservation and 1668ha for other uses. (...) The forest is seeking CDM certification [...] Pre-evaluation for the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) has taken place’ (company’s website, entry undated, seems to be from 2009)</td>
<td>Company’s website: <a href="http://www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx">www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx</a> (accessed 30.01.2013)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other (former) subsidiaries in Tanzania (see entry for Lindi Forests Ltd in this table and entries for Tanga Forests Ltd in Table 4)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mapanda: 2 476ha planted until 2009; ‘Mapanda Forest covers 6 258ha (…) 3536ha is plantable, with 753ha set aside for conservation and 1948ha for other uses. (...) FSC certification (…) on 8 August 2008 and voluntary carbon standard (VCS) certification was achieved on 17 July 2009.’ (company’s website, entry undated, seems to be from 2009) ‘(…) at least 10% of the revenues will go to community development and environmental protection’ (company’s website) ‘The new plantations and improvements will help it create 500 permanent jobs and 5 000 seasonal positions by 2011’ (IFC no date) In 2000, the company’s afforestation project was certified by the Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), the leading global certification and inspection company, and sold the first options on carbon credits (company’s website, in Chachage 2010) ‘Reforestation at the Idete Forest Project’ submitted as CDM project, in Jan 2013 at validation (UNEP Risoe 2013)</td>
<td>support to company)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Green Resources Ltd (Norwegian)</td>
<td>Kilombero</td>
<td>Forest plantation</td>
<td>Approved: 12 161ha (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>Village lands (uncultivated)</td>
<td>Uchindile Forest: until 2009 around 3160ha planted (company’s website)</td>
<td>Sulle 2012 (interview and phone communication with the District Land Officer, Nov 2012)</td>
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<td>subsidiary of Green Resources SA, see also entry for Green Resources Ltd in Mufindi</td>
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<td>soft wood for timber and carbon credit</td>
<td>12 121ha ('titled', company’s website, entry undated, but seems to be from 2009)</td>
<td>10 000ha additional request, approved by the District Council, awaiting the Land Commissioner’s approval (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>Total area 12 121ha, of which 7252ha of the land are plantable, and 1 700ha are set aside for conservation, with 3161ha for other uses. (...) The objective (...) is growing trees for carbon sequestration and to harvest forest products for sawn timber, transmission poles and renewable energy. (...) FSC certification was attained on 8 August 2008 and VCS certification was achieved on 17 July 2009. The trees (...) are mainly pinus patula and eucalyptus saligna. (company’s website, entry undated, but seems to be from 2009)</td>
<td>Company’s website: <a href="http://greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx">greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx</a> (accessed 30.01.2013)</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>InfEnergy Co. Ltd</td>
<td>Kilombero</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>7 000ha (Miller Estate)</td>
<td></td>
<td>In 2001 the estate was privatised by the Government of Tanzania and became member of the Super Group of Companies — the current owner (Sulle, 2010)</td>
<td>Mlingwa 2010 (a document obtained by Sulle April 2010) Sulle 2010 (personal communication with Chairman of Tanzania sugarcane growers association Dr Mlingwa in April 2010) Sulle 2013 (Kazinja personal communication. Jan 2013)</td>
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<td>New name, see: Kilombero Plantations Limited (KPL)</td>
<td></td>
<td>for both local market and exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Kagera Sugar Limited (...) was offered for privatisation by the Government of Tanzania in December 2001. Since then, KSL became another member in the Super Group of Companies’ (company’s website)</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>KCY Mpanga Co.Ltd (Kilimo cha Yesu) (Switzerland) P.O. Box 156 Mlimba / Mpanga supported by the Swiss association Verein HST (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe in Tanzania) Hermann Graser Stalden 25 5724 Dürrenäsch <a href="http://www.mpanga.ch/de/index.html">www.mpanga.ch/de/index.html</a> Company manager and president of association: Bruno Wicki <a href="mailto:brunowicki@yahoo.de">brunowicki@yahoo.de</a></td>
<td>Kilombero</td>
<td>Rice (support for local small farmers)</td>
<td>3 000ha in Mpanga village (Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011) 263ha = 650 acre, of which around 500 acre usable for agriculture; no title deeds despite efforts to get them, but agreement with Ngalimila village, paying annual lease of 5 000Tsh/acre (Locher 2013)</td>
<td>village land, unused (Locher 2013) Land in Mpanga village, granted to the company by Ngalimila village in 2008 (Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011)</td>
<td>Advancing tractor services to peasants; kind of share-cropping arrangement between the company and neighboring villagers (Mwami and Kamata 2011) KCY Mpanga registered in Tanzania as company by mistake (in 2004), currently in the process of registering as NGO. Its activities focus on support to small farmers (rent of tractors, microcredits, storage facilities etc.). Financially supported by the religious association Verein HST. KCY Mpanga acquired land with plan to cultivate rice for the purpose of supporting the church and the NGO’s activities with its profit In 2004, having suffered a total loss, KCY Mpanga decided to sublease the land at cost price to local farmers on a yearly basis; the land is subleased after being ploughed and planted with rice, KCY Mpanga also organises the protection of the harvest from birds and animals; the lease in 2012 was 170 000Tsh/acre (payable in two rates before and after the harvest)</td>
<td>Mwami and Kamata 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011) Locher 2013 (mail contact with company manager Bruno Wicki in Dec 2012 and Jan 2013)</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Kilombero Plantations Limited (KPL) (British/Tanzanian) Subsidiary of AGRICA Ltd <a href="#">www.agrica.com/html/project1.html</a> Joint venture with Rufiji Basin Development Authority (RUBADA) (Chachage 2010; The Citizen 2009) KPL was earlier a subsidiary of InfEnergy Co. Ltd <a href="#">AAC 2008</a> AGRICA Ltd funded by the Norwegian government’s Norfund, private African Agricultural Capital (AAC) investment fund and Capricorn Investment Group (company’s website) AGRICA UK Limited 145 Kensington Church St. London W8 7LP AGRICA manager is former TFCG-boss Carter Coleman</td>
<td>Kilombero</td>
<td>Rice for domestic market, mainly Dar es Salaam earlier also oil palm (AAC 2008; Chachage 2012)</td>
<td>5 818ha (on progress, Bengesi et al. 2009; Mwamila et al. 2009, Gordon-Maclean et al. 2009; Oakland Institute 2011a) 5 819ha (Sulle 2012) about 8 000ha acquired (company’s website)</td>
<td>Former government farm (‘Mngeta farm’ located in Mngeta village), formerly belonging to Korea Tanzania Company (KOTACO) and then to RUBADA (Chachage 2010; Mwani &amp; Kamata 2011). land partly occupied, see next column</td>
<td>Under the earlier ownership of InfEnergy KPL ‘established an oil palm nursery and plans to plant 7 500ha to oil palm’ (AAC 2008) EIA assessment in progress (Bengesi et al. 2009) Conflicts with local people using the land about resettlement and delayed/owing compensation (Chachage 2010) After KOTACO phased out peasant farmers reoccupied the land formerly alienated from them. When the new investor came the villagers resisted to vacate and only moved when an arrangement was concluded; each household was promised a three acre farm and a house built at the company’s expenses; in 2011, 3 000ha of land was planted with rice, production highly mechanised (Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011) Kilombero Plantations was earlier a joint venture between RUBADA and North Korea from the late 1980s until 1994. When the North Koreans left, ‘squatters’ moved onto the land. RUBADA has given all the ‘squatter’ families three acres and is building them houses in lieu of the land needed for the investment (Oakland Institute 2011a) Company’s website: In 2010, AGRICA was awarded National Strategic Investor Status by the Tanzania Government; now the leading rice producer in East Africa; in 2011 a showcase project in the World Economic Forum’s Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania; active with rice production; introduced System for Rice Intensification (SRI) for 250 families in 2011, expected to have 4 300 farmers families included in the SRI project by 2016</td>
<td>Gordon-Maclean et al. 2009 (probably based on Songela &amp; Maclean 2008) Sulle 2008 (interview with Carter Colman – then Director for InfEnergy) AAC 2008 (annual report of the project funder) Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) Chachage 2010 (based on village documents, interview with company staff and several other sources) Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011) Oakland Institute 2011a (fieldwork Dec 2010, data from RUBADA) Chachage 2012 (blog entry about renaming of InfEnergy to AGRICA) Sulle 2012 (interview with District Land Officer, Nov 2012) Company’s website: <a href="#">www.agrica.com/html/background.html</a> <a href="#">www.agrica.com/html/project2.html</a> (accessed 31.01.2013)</td>
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<td>Kilombero Sugar Company Limited (South African, British, Tanzanian) 55 percent shares held by Illovo Sugar Ltd, South Africa, 20% by ED&amp;F Man, the London-based commodities group, and 25% by the Government of Tanzania (Illovo Sugar Limited 2010:26 in Chachage 2010:16). (Illovo Sugar Ltd is subsidiary of Associated British Foods and has also plantations in Malawi, Swaziland, Mozambique and Zambia) PO Box 50, Kidatu, Tanzania 023 262 6111 023 262 6188 fax</td>
<td>Kilombero</td>
<td>Sugar for food, domestic market (company’s website)</td>
<td>8 000ha (Mlingwa 2010) additional land acquisition from several villages under process, status unclear, (Chachage 2010, Locher 2010) 9 272.54ha requested (Chachage 2010) 28 500ha leased (Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011)</td>
<td>former state estate village land (acquisition on-going in 2010) (Sulle 2010)</td>
<td>In addition to the company’s plantation, out-growers plant sugar on 12 000ha (individual property, but mostly held without title deeds, Mlingwa 2010) Wanted to expand, supported five villages for village land use plans in March 2010, only two villages have agreed to give land (Locher 2010) Several conflicts (also at court) regarding planned/established expansion of company (Chachage 2010) Company uses irrigation system; Illovo Sugar Ltd inherited a long standing land conflict with the surrounding villages which dates back to the Kilombero Sugar Company’s establishment in the 1960s; villagers from Msolwa station, Selous Game Reserve, Gombala and Nyange invaded around 1 976ha. Illovo Sugar Ltd requested compensation from the government for the lost land. The government agreed to compensate the company by allocating land in Lwipa; the company refused, arguing that it was too far from their plant. It instead demanded about 6000ha to establish another plant in Lwipa. The government refused their request; the company won a case against the government in court; problem still unsolved (Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011) ‘ABB and Kilombero Sugar Company work with UNDP to manage rural electrification in Tanzania’ (UN Business, no date) Construction of the Illovo Distillers Tanzania Ltd ethanol distillery next to Kilombero’s K2 factory going on in 2012 (text and pictures on company’s website) According to a newspaper article in Jan 2012, the company has closed due to unsolved land issues and moved its business to Mali (DailyNews 2012)</td>
<td>Chachage 2010 (field visit Aug 2010) Locher 2010 (interview with Mr. Kami, National Land Use Planning Commission, Aug 2010) Mlingwa 2010 (a document obtained by Sulle April 2010) Sulle 2010 (personal communication with Chairman of Tanzania sugarcane growers association Dr Mlingwa in April 2010) Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011 (fieldwork in May and June 2011) Company’s website: <a href="http://www.illovosugar.co.za">www.illovosugar.co.za</a> (accessed 30.01.2013) UN Business, no date (information about collaboration with UNDP) DailyNews 2012 (<a href="http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/dailynews/1271-blunders-in-sugar-cane-project-are-economic-saboteurs">www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/dailynews/1271-blunders-in-sugar-cane-project-are-economic-saboteurs</a>)</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Kilombero Valley Teak Company</td>
<td>Kilombero, Ulanga</td>
<td>Teak</td>
<td>4 748ha in operation (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>‘...aim of creating a viable hardwood reforestation project with teak plantations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jew et al. 2009 (fieldwork)</td>
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<td>(multinational/Finish) owned by Global Environment Fund (GEF, funded by development finance institutions from North America, Europe, and Africa) and Finnfund (mainly Finish government) <a href="http://www.kvtc-tz.com/home">www.kvtc-tz.com/home</a></td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>for timber export</td>
<td>28 159ha leased (Jew 2009) 28 000ha (Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011) 28 800ha in 2011 (company’s website)</td>
<td>arranged in a mosaic between natural forests and other natural vegetation (…) presently undergoing certification from the Forestry Stewardship Scheme (FSC) and ISO 14001” (Jew et al. 2009) 7 000ha planted with teak; the first harvest of 24ha is expected in 2013. The remaining 20 000ha support large areas of indigenous Miombo woodland rich in biodiversity (Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011) ‘An area of 8 200ha has been established since 1993 and new plantings have been carried out annually. 2011 was the last year of planting new areas and the company has now reached full rotation size’, 20 000ha are kept for protection and management of native forests and wetlands (company’s website) ‘The Kilombero Valley Teak Company Ltd. (KVTC) has donated a total of 40m²- to Kilombero and Ulanga districts for development.’ (company’s website, dated 2009) In 2010, the company planned to invest more than US$50 Million; 5 000ha will be utilised as a demonstration of irrigation rice farm jointly owned by KRC and RUBADA. The next 5 000ha will be for smallholders and 5 000ha for small industries and the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) (<a href="http://dailynews.co.tz/business/?n=12480">http://dailynews.co.tz/business/?n=12480</a>) Half of the total land (50 000ha) planned to be for smallholders (Oakland Institute 2011a) food processing complex to be set up for export to Korea (TanzaniaInvest 2009)</td>
<td>Mwami &amp; Kamata 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011) Sulle 2012 (interview with the Kilombero District Land Officer, Nov 2012) Company’s website (accessed 30.01.2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Korean Rural Community Cooperation (KRC) (South Korean, collaboration with RUBADA) (named Korean Rural Development Cooperation by OI 2011a)</td>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>Rice for domestic and export market</td>
<td>15 000ha (Oakland Institute 2011a; Daily News &amp; RUBADA 2012) 100 000ha (Tanzania Invest 2009) Planned: 50 000ha (under acquisition process, Oakland Institute 2011a) Village land (Mkongo Block and Ikwiriri Block), identified by RUBADA and marketed as potential investment area</td>
<td>Around 600ha planted until 2009 (company’s website)</td>
<td>TanzaniaInvest 2009 (investment website) Rugonzibwa 2010 (government newspaper ‘Daily News’ article) Oakland Institute 2011a (fieldwork Dec 2010, data from RUBADA) RUBADA 2012 (document by RUBADA obtained by Sulle in Dec 2012) Sulle 2013 (mail contact with RUBADA official in Jan 2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table continues with more entries.*

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**Land Deal Politics Initiative**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
<th>Location (district)</th>
<th>Product and purpose</th>
<th>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</th>
<th>Land status before acquisition</th>
<th>Status, business model, additional information</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 25  | Lukulilo Farm Holdings P.O. Box 7995 DSM (UK-based) | Rufiji | Paddy | 8 002ha (DAO 2012) 5 000ha (RUBADA 2012) | Village land (Ndundunyikanza, Nyaminy will, Kipugira and Kipov villages) | Approved by the District Council 10 000ha  
Requested: 15 000ha | Land Use Plans (LUP) ready (RUBADA 2012)  
Registered under TIC 10/11/2011, will start November 2014 (DAO 2012) |
|     | Not active, probably closing down (Locher 2013) | Registered in BREA database as incorporated in Dec 2005 |                    |                                          |                               | Locher 2013 (interview with former Plantation Operations Manager of Tanga Forest, Feb 2013) |
| 26  | Mufindi Paper Mills (Indian) | Kilombero | Soft wood for paper production | Approved by the District Council 10 000ha  
Requested: 15 000ha | Village lands, awaiting land transfer procedures | The company aims to use plantation model | RUBADA 2012 (document by RUBADA received by Sulle in Dec 2012)  
DAO 2012 (document by the DAO received by Sulle in Dec 2012)  
Sulle 2012 (interview with the District Land Officer, DLO, in Nov 2012) |
| 27  | Nava Bharat Africa Resources PVT Ltd (NBAR) (Indian) P.O. Box 939 DSM | Mkuranga | Palm oil (planned) Sugarcane (earlier plan) | Requested: 10 000ha  
Allocated: none | Village Land | The company’s proposal to grow sugarcane was rejected by the Kiwanga and Ndundutawa villages. The investor currently aims to grow palm oil in the district and efforts are underway to secure other land. The investor already paid facilitation fees | RUBADA 2012 (document by RUBADA received by Sulle in Dec 2012) |
<p>| 1   | Pharos Financial Group (private company UAE) - Pharos Miro Agriculture Fund <a href="http://www.pharosfund.com/index.html">www.pharosfund.com/index.html</a> | Mwanza | Rice | Planned: 50 000ha (Bakr 2010) | Not registered in BRELA database | Not registered in BRELA database | Bakr 2010 (Reuters article) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Rufiji Sugar Plant (foreign, origin unclear) (RUBADA 2012) P.O. Box 15737 DSM</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Sugar Cane</td>
<td>12 132ha (status unclear) (DAO 2012) Village Land (Tawi, Nyamwage and Utunge Villages)</td>
<td>Registered under TIC 9/5/2012, will start May 2015 (DAO 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>DAO 2012 (document by DAO received by Sulle in Dec 2012) RUBADA 2012 (document by RUBADA received by Sulle in Dec 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 29  | SAP Agriculture Ltd (Turkish)  
*We assume that this company is identical with Safe Production Ltd, see respective entry in Table 4* | Rufiji | Paddy and maize for food purposes | 5 000ha in Nyamwage village (Mwami & Kamata 2011) 5 000ha of Nyamwage and Ikwiriri villages (Kweka 2012) Village land | Villagers have complained a lot about the company’s land acquisition and the force used to authorise its land acquisition (Sulle 2009 field visits; Kweka 2012)  
The company farmed 500ha–600ha until 2006, no activities since then; according to village council of Nyamwage and company representative in Rufiji the land has been passed on to another company called Majani ya Chai (Mwami & Kamata 2011)  
The company wants to expand (Locher 2010a)  
Investor has no information about this investor (Locher 2010b)  
Among the total area the company owns 2 000ha fall on the same villages that have also given land to EcoEnergy. Shanta Estates Ltd claim to own right of occupancy against the agreement made by the Ministry of Lands and EcoEnergy (Sulle 2012) | | Sulle & Nelson 2009 (field visits 2008 and 2009)  
Mwami & Kamata 2011 (fieldwork in May/June 2011)  
Kweka 2012 (field work in 2012)  
Sulle 2012 (field visits, interview with the Village Chairman) |
Investor wants to expand (Locher 2010a)  
TIC: no information about this investor (Locher 2010b)  
Among the total area the company owns 2 000ha fall on the same villages that have also given land to EcoEnergy. Shanta Estates Ltd claim to own right of occupancy against the agreement made by the Ministry of Lands and EcoEnergy (Sulle 2012) | | Mwamila et al. 2009:8 (field work in 2008)  
Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, fieldwork)  
Locher 2010a (interview with Catherine Makudi, National Land Use Planning Commission, Aug 2010)  
Locher 2010b (interview with TIC officials, Aug 2010)  
Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLNRO, Nov 2012) |
| 31  | Sun Biofuels  
*Changed its owner and name to 30 Degree East, see entry in this table* | Kisarawe | Jatropha | 30 000ha Village land | | | |
<p>| 32  | SyEnergy Agriproduction (Indian) | Kilombero | Rice for both local and | Requested: 30 000ha Village land (Melala Village) | Envision to use plantation business model | | Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLO, Nov 2012) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
<th>Location (district)</th>
<th>Product and purpose</th>
<th>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</th>
<th>Land status before acquisition</th>
<th>Status, business model, additional information</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td><strong>The New Forests Company (NFC)</strong>&lt;br&gt;UK, South Africa (also Uganda, Mozambique)&lt;br&gt;<a href="http://www.newforests.net/">www.newforests.net/</a></td>
<td>Kilolo (office Iringa)</td>
<td>Tree plantation (pine, eucalyptus) for timber products and carbon compensation</td>
<td>about 6 000ha (gazetted, Chachage &amp; Baha 2010) 4 800ha (transferred in Aug 2009 in five villages Isele, Ukwega, Ipalamwa, Magome, no granted rights titles until April 2011) and 1 175ha (transferred in Kising’a and Isele, probably in 2010) (Locher 2011) further acquisition planned (Locher 2013) Requested: 30 000ha (Chachage &amp; Baha 2010)</td>
<td>Village land (mostly belonging to individuals, partly reserve village land)</td>
<td>Chachage &amp; Baha 2010: Promotional meetings by the investor in 2006 in 11 villages, about 6 000ha land available for the investor in six villages; land acquisition process still on-going; conflicts about: — land in Kidabaga village that has been transferred to the company apparently without the affected people’s awareness and consent (involved people from Kidabaga and neighbour village Kiwalamo) — amount and outstanding payment of compensation to village council and affected villagers in Kidabaga (and Kiwalamo) Locher 2011: land (use) rights of villagers of Kidabaga and Kiwalamo affected by the land deal confirmed in Sep 2010; as the land had been transferred to general land already, affected villagers were urged to sign their agreement to get compensation; compensation payment until April 2011 still pending Additional land acquisitions from individuals going on in several villages (Isele, Kising’a, Ukwega, Ipalamwa, Magome), compensation partly paid, partly pending until April 2011 First plantations and tree nursery established in 2009 in Kidabaga (Locher 2011) By the end of March 2011, over 1 500ha planted to pine and eucalypt (company’s website) Not known at National Land Use Planning Commission (Locher 2010)</td>
<td>Chachage &amp; Baha 2010 (fieldwork in May/June 2010) Locher 2010 (interview with Catherine Makudi, National Land Use Planning Commission, Aug 2010) Locher 2011 (fieldwork in Aug 2010, Jan and May 2011, interviews with district officials, local leaders and villagers) Locher 2013 (mail contact with DLO in Feb 2013) Company’s website: <a href="http://www.newforests.net/index.php/hmd_article/tanzania">www.newforests.net/index.php/hmd_article/tanzania</a> (accessed 30.01.2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Information on domestic land deals in Tanzania

As a by-product of our recent data collection, we provide a small compilation of domestic land deals. Land acquisitions by national investors were not our main focus initially, so this collection is far from exhaustive. Nevertheless, we would like to provide the information we obtained as a starting point for further research, as we believe that it will be important to pay more attention to this aspect of the 'land grab' phenomenon in future.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Location (district)</th>
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<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Donesta Ltd</td>
<td>Kongwa (Bengesi et al, 2009)</td>
<td>Jatropha and sunflower</td>
<td>2 000ha (Songela &amp; Maclean 2008; Bengesi et al. 2009)</td>
<td>Status 2008 (Songela &amp; Maclean): 200ha planted with sunflower, 100 000 jatropha seedlings (in Songela &amp; Maclean mentioned as one company together with Savannah Biofuels Ltd)</td>
<td>200ha already planted (Bengesi et al. 2009) Initially led by the late Tanzanian retired agricultural officer (Sulle 2012) According to the Kongwa District Forest Officer, the company is no longer in operation. However, it might be just doing sunflower plantation using the same name or another name (Sulle 2012) Donesta registered in BRELA as incorporated in Dec 2006</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 Kamanga 2008 (field research, data from MEM, MAFS) Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) Sulle 2012 (personal communication with the Kongwa District Forest Officer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>ECO Green Fuels Tanzania Ltd (Tanzanian)</td>
<td>Morogoro (Mikese)</td>
<td>500ha</td>
<td>Village land with little direct use</td>
<td>Tree planting for the production of clean and sustainable charcoal. It was an initiative of TATEDO (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLNRO, Nov 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>JKT Tanzania</td>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>Jatropha and staff training</td>
<td>384ha (950 acres)</td>
<td>Military farms for development activities</td>
<td>The Military aimed to develop small jatropha farms on their land and use some of these farms for training purposes among its staff. The farms are as follows: Ojoro 100 acres (is now in Meru District), Mgamo 100 acres, Chita 100 acres, Maramba 100 acres, Miale 50 acres, Ruvu 500 acres (Kamanga 2008)</td>
<td>Kamanga 2008 (data from the MEM) Sulle 2009 (interviews with the JKT agricultural officials at JKT headquarters in Dar es Salaam, February 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Kapunga Rice Project (Tanzanian)</td>
<td>Mbarali</td>
<td>Rice/Jatropha</td>
<td>50 000ha (Kamanga 2008, Oakland Institute 2011a) 5 500ha acquired, 5 500ha developed (HAKIARDH forthoming)</td>
<td>NAFCO farm In 2006 it was sold to Export Trading Co. Ltd (Chachage &amp; Mbunda 2009)</td>
<td>Attempted to replant rice with Jatropha in food producing area but President directed not to do so (Chachage &amp; Mbunda 2009)</td>
<td>Kamanga 2008 (data from MEM) Chachage &amp; Mbunda 2009 (field visits 2009 in Kilimanjaro, Morogoro and many other regions) Oakland Institute 2011a (data from several sources, maybe TIC or Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Investor (nationality, contact details)</td>
<td>Location (district)</td>
<td>Product and purpose</td>
<td>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</td>
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<td>Sources of information</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Kilombero Farms Company Ltd</td>
<td>Kilombero (Mofu area)</td>
<td>Rice for domestic market</td>
<td>405ha started acquiring in 1999, derivatives rights ready by 2001 (Sulle 2012)</td>
<td>Village lands</td>
<td>‘Villagers consulted claimed that the Canadian investor had abandoned the venture leaving behind his Tanzanian partners who were struggling to maintain it’ (Chachage 2010:23)</td>
<td>Chachage 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(earlier Canadian and Tanzanian, now only Tanzanian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Mtwibwa Sugar Estate Ltd</td>
<td>Mvomero</td>
<td>Sugar for local market and export</td>
<td>7 000ha (Miller Estate, plus 11 000ha by out-growers)</td>
<td>Previously owned by the State</td>
<td>Sugar Industries Limited (TSIL), which is owned by a consortium of Tanzanian businesspersons from Turiani (undated document, author unclear). ‘Part of the sugar produced is exported to the EU under the Sugar Protocol while the remaining is sold locally.’ (company's website)</td>
<td>Mlingwa 2010 (field experience)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Tanzanian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>undated document, author unclear (<a href="http://dissertations.ub.rug.nl/FACULTIES/jur/2011/a.k.n.kamuzora/05_c5.pdf">http://dissertations.ub.rug.nl/FACULTIES/jur/2011/a.k.n.kamuzora/05_c5.pdf</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>National Service (JKT)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td>700ha</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Savannah Biofuels Ltd</td>
<td>Dodoma (Bengesi et al. 2009)</td>
<td>Jatropha and sunflower For biodiesel, for export to Europe</td>
<td>5 000ha (Bengesi et al. 2009)</td>
<td>Status 2008 (Songela &amp; Maclean): 200ha planted with sunflower, 100 000 jatropha seedlings (in Songela &amp; Maclean mentioned as one company together with Donesta Ltd) Registered in BRELA as incorporated on 18 Dec 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Tanzanian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Tanzania Green</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td>200ha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Information on land deals in Tanzania by investors with unclear origin
Even after extensive research we still find many deals with unclear information about the investors’ background. These are provided in this separate list.
### Table 3: Deals with unclear information about investor’s background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
<th>Location (district)</th>
<th>Product and purpose</th>
<th>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</th>
<th>Land status before acquisition</th>
<th>Status, business model, additional information</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Euro Mine Export Ltd (origin unclear)</td>
<td>Morogoro (Mi kese)</td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The company only got a building site and its recent status is unknown (Sulle 2012).</td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives); Sulle 2012 (meeting with DLNRO Nov 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Oxman Tanzania Ltd (origin unclear)</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>(rice, but not growing)</td>
<td>914ha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not growing anything on the land acquired.</td>
<td>Oakland Institute 2011a (fieldwork Dec 2010, data from RUBADA and several other sources); Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>RUBANA farm (origin unclear)</td>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td>400ha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives); Sulle 2012 (interviews with district land and agricultural officials, Nov 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Rural upgrade fund (origin unclear)</td>
<td>Kiliwa</td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not known by the district land and agricultural officials (Sulle 2012).</td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives); Sulle 2012 (interviews with district land and agricultural officials, Nov 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>SYNERGY Tanzania Ltd (origin unclear)</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Sugar cane</td>
<td>20 000ha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan to create 5 000 new employments.</td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives); Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLNRO, Nov 2012s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Tanzania Biodiesel Plant Ltd (origin unclear)</td>
<td>Bagamoyo</td>
<td>Oil palm</td>
<td>16 000ha (district approval in 2008, Mwamila et al. 2009; derivative right titles underway, Bengesi et al. 2009 and Oakland Institute 2011a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>In 2008: no survey yet, TIC decision pendent; villages: Mandra, Kilemera, Mihunga (Mwamila et al. 2009); Until Nov 2012 the President was yet to approve the transfer of villages lands to general lands (Sulle 2012).</td>
<td>Mwamila et al. 2009:8; Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, fieldwork); Oakland Institute 2011a (fieldwork Dec 2010, data from several other sources); Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLNRO, Nov 2012s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.5 Information on ceased and aborted land deal projects in Tanzania

For this compilation, where possible, we give the reason for the termination or abortion of the project in the column ‘Development, cessation, additional information’. We have included projects which have been inactive for some time or for which we have clear indication of termination. But of course we cannot be sure whether some of these projects will be taken up in the future. Land deal projects whose status as active or inactive is uncertain are not included here, but in the Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3.
### Table 4: Land deal projects that have ceased or been aborted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
<th>Location (district)</th>
<th>Product and purpose</th>
<th>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</th>
<th>Land status before acquisition</th>
<th>Development, cessation, additional information</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 31  | **Africa Green Oils Ltd**  
   (Norwegian)  
   Box 34463  
   Dar es Salaam  
   [www.africagreenoils.com/](http://www.africagreenoils.com/)  
   (accessed 12.01.2013, the website is inactive)  
   [www.cdrex.com/afica-green-oil-limited-204887.html](http://www.cdrex.com/afica-green-oil-limited-204887.html)  
   **860ha (acquired), Sulle & Nelson 2009, Mwamila et al. 2009**  
   **30 000ha** (Bengesi et al. 2009)  
   **5 000ha** (Oakland Institute 2011a, company’s website, accessed by Locher in Aug 2010, see also WRM 2010)  
   Of total 860ha acquired, 500ha in Ruarkia A and 360ha in Nyamatanga (Mwamila et al. 2009)  
   Operational (Bengesi et al. 2009)  
   According to the company’s website, it has ‘already acquired 5 000ha and planted 435ha by 31st May 2009’ (quoted by WRM 2010)  
   Company will leave the area if they cannot acquire more land (Oakland Institute 2011a)  
   Company wanted to abandon the existing plantation and requested other land at the Rufiji river banks instead, district decision pending (Mwami and Kamata 2011)  
   Recent information from the district officials indicate that the company failed to convince communities that resisted giving up their land and it is no longer active in the area (Sulle 2012 & 2013)  
   On 12.01.2013, the company’s website (which was active earlier, see also WRM 2010) is inactive and for sale  
   [Oakland Institute 2011a (fieldwork Dec 2010, data from RUBADA and several other sources)](http://www.cdrex.com/afica-green-oil-limited-204887.html)  
   [Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLO, Nov 2012)](http://www.cdrex.com/afica-green-oil-limited-204887.html)  
   [WRM 2010 (quoting the company’s website)](http://www.cdrex.com/afica-green-oil-limited-204887.html)  
   [Baruani Mshale 2009 (fieldwork June–Sep 2009, data not included in this table, see annotated reference list 6.2)](http://www.cdrex.com/afica-green-oil-limited-204887.html) |
| 32  | **Biodiesel East African Ltd**  
   (Kenyan) | Bahi | Proposed Jatropha  
   **Proposed: 10 000ha** | Village lands | The company is no longer active in the district. Initially, it went straight to the villages to mobilise land; given poor estimation capacities, villages intended to give more land than what they would remain with. This prompted the District Council to form a team of councillors for investigation. The team advised the company to take a reasonable amount of land (500ha), but the company disappeared (Sulle 2012)  
   [Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLO, Nov 2012)](http://www.cdrex.com/afica-green-oil-limited-204887.html) |
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Boleyn International (T) Ltd&lt;br&gt;Mr Jerry Liu</td>
<td>Mkinga district</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed land deal in Mkinga district, status unclear <em>(Locher 2010)</em>&lt;br&gt;The company’s proposal for land acquisition was rejected by the Mkinga District Council; after the controversial land deal between the district council, ministry and the Arkadia (see above), the district council didn’t want to enter into another agreement related to land matters; Further, district officials rejected most of the investment proposal as insufficient <em>(Sulle 2012)</em>.</td>
<td>Registered in BRELA database as incorporated in 2000</td>
<td>Locher 2010 (interview with Catherine Makudi, National Land Use Planning Commission, Aug 2010)&lt;br&gt;Sulle 2012 (interview with DLNRO)</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Investor (nationality, contact details)</td>
<td>Location (district)</td>
<td>Product and purpose</td>
<td>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</td>
<td>Land status before acquisition</td>
<td>Development, cessation, additional information</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>D1 Oils Tanzania Ltd (established in 2003)</td>
<td>Tabora (Kaliua)</td>
<td>Jatropha for biofuels carbon credits (planned, not realised)</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008: The company planned to have biofuels purification station in every district. However, it abandoned its plans in Tanzania immature Website of new company does not mention Tanzania, but focuses on Asia</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008: The company planned to have biofuels purification station in every district. However, it abandoned its plans in Tanzania immature Website of new company does not mention Tanzania, but focuses on Asia</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (interviews with government officials in Ministries, TIC, National Biofuels Task Force (NBTF), Kisarawe, Kilwa and Meru districts, with representatives of local communities, directors of companies and others) Investor’s website: <a href="http://www.neosplc.com/2012/03/15/change-of-name-to-neos-resources-plc/">www.neosplc.com/2012/03/15/change-of-name-to-neos-resources-plc/</a> (accessed 31.01.2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>J&amp;J Group (Pty) Ltd (South African) Pretoria</td>
<td>Tabora (Kaliua)</td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008: The company planned to have biofuels purification station in every district. However, it abandoned its plans in Tanzania immature Website of new company does not mention Tanzania, but focuses on Asia</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008: The company planned to have biofuels purification station in every district. However, it abandoned its plans in Tanzania immature Website of new company does not mention Tanzania, but focuses on Asia</td>
<td>Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 (interviews with government officials in Ministries, TIC, National Biofuels Task Force (NBTF), Kisarawe, Kilwa and Meru districts, with representatives of local communities, directors of companies and others) Investor’s website: <a href="http://www.neosplc.com/2012/03/15/change-of-name-to-neos-resources-plc/">www.neosplc.com/2012/03/15/change-of-name-to-neos-resources-plc/</a> (accessed 31.01.2013)</td>
<td>Kaarhus et al. 2010 (data from Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- **CAMS Agri-Energy Tanzania Ltd.**
  - See entry for the company in Bagamoyo.
  - The company is no longer active in the district; it sent the proposal for investment in land, but did not make any follow-up (Sulle 2012).
  - Sources of information: Oakland Institute 2011a (several sources, exact source unclear) Sulle 2012 (interview with District Land Surveyor, Dec 2012).

- **Clean Power Tanzania Ltd.**
  - Origin unclear.
  - The company is no longer active in the district; no LUPs were done (Sulle 2012).

- **D1 Oils Tanzania Ltd**
  - Established in 2003.
  - Subsidiary of D1 Oils Plc (UK), Newcastle.
  - New name since March 2012: NEOS Resources plc.
  - Website of new company does not mention Tanzania, but focuses on Asia.
  - March 2012 (investor website): Announcement of new name (from D1 Oils plc to NEOS Resources plc) to reflect the Company’s focus on the processing of nonedible oil-seed complexes and to distinguish the Company with its new operations from the Company with its previous operations.
  - Sources of information: Songela & Maclean 2008 (interviews with government officials in Ministries, TIC, National Biofuels Task Force (NBTF), Kisarawe, Kilwa and Meru districts, with representatives of local communities, directors of companies and others) Investor’s website: www.neosplc.com/2012/03/15/change-of-name-to-neos-resources-plc/ (accessed 31.01.2013).

- **J&J Group (Pty) Ltd**
  - South African.
  - Pretoria.
  - No information about the status, no information on the company’s website regarding any investment in Tanzania.
  - Probably identical with JCI Co. Ltd, see respective entry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investor (nationality, contact details)</th>
<th>Location (district)</th>
<th>Product and purpose</th>
<th>Acquired land and planned total size (ha)</th>
<th>Land status before acquisition</th>
<th>Development, cessation, additional information</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>JCJ Co. Ltd (Tanzania/foreign, origin unknown)</td>
<td>Mwanza, Mara, Shinyanga, Tabora</td>
<td>Jatropha</td>
<td>No clear information about the status; the company might never have been active on the ground</td>
<td>Probably identical with J&amp;J Group (Pty) Ltd, see respective entry</td>
<td>Sülle 2008 (interview with the Company’s co-founder) Sülle 2008 (interview with the Company's co-founder) Songela &amp; Maclean 2008 Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives)</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>Safe Production Ltd (Turkish)</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Maize, Rice</td>
<td>3,500ha requested: 3,500ha</td>
<td>The company appears to have ceased production after only growing on 600ha since 2005 (OI 2011a) Not registered in BRELA database</td>
<td>Oakland Institute 2011a (fieldwork Dec 2010, data from RUBADA and several other sources)</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Savannah Biofuels Ltd (see entry for Savannah Biofuels Ltd in Dodoma, Table 2)</td>
<td>Handeni (Bengesi et al. 2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not active at the moment, but company’s agent sent application to the district in 2009/2010 which remained unprocessed until Dec 2012 (Sülle 2012)</td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) Sülle 2012 (interview with the Handeni District Land Surveyor, Dec 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Savannah Biofuels Ltd (see entry for Savannah Biofuels Ltd in Dodoma, Table 2)</td>
<td>Kongwa (Bengesi et al. 2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not active in Kongwa (Sülle 2012)</td>
<td>Bengesi et al. 2009 (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives) Sülle 2012 (personal communication with the District Forest Officer, Dec 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Investor (nationality, contact details)</td>
<td>Location (district)</td>
<td>Product and purpose</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tanga Forests Ltd. (Norwegian)</td>
<td>Handeni</td>
<td>Soft wood (planned)</td>
<td>Acquired: None Requested: 3 000ha</td>
<td>Proposed areas were village lands</td>
<td>The company requested 3 000ha but the District Council approved only 500ha. Then the company disappeared, even though it already planted some trees in Mazingara Village. ‘In 2008, 536ha of new forest were established, including the first planting in the Handeni region’ (company’s website)</td>
<td>Sulle 2012 (interview with Handeni District Land Surveyor, Dec 2012) Company’s website: <a href="http://www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx">www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx</a> (accessed 30.01.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanga Forests Ltd. (Norwegian)</td>
<td>Mkinga</td>
<td>Soft wood (planned)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aimed to establish tree plantation; the plans ended up at the proposal stage (Sulle 2012) ‘There is large potential for establishing forest in Tanga, but the land acquisition process is slow. (...) Green Resources is in the process of obtaining additional land in the (...) districts of Handeni, Klindi and Mkinga’ (company’s website, entry undated, but seems to be from 2009)</td>
<td>Sulle 2012 (interview with the DLNRO, Dec 2012) Company’s website: <a href="http://www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx">www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx</a> (accessed 30.01.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Tanga Forests Ltd. (Norwegian)</td>
<td>Pangani</td>
<td>Forest plantations soft and hard wood</td>
<td>7 500ha (Plantation Operations Manager, Locher 2013) 9 500ha (company’s website)</td>
<td>Village reserve land (no individual land)</td>
<td>Land acquisitions in Kwakibuyu, Meka, Mseko (new village, split from Meka), Mtongo, Mtonga, Stahabu; surveys complete, waiting for approval by Land Commissioner. Langoni also provided land, but apparently not its own village land: Mtonga and Mseko accuse Langoni of having provided their villages’ land to the company. According to the district land officer, this view was also supported by the Ministry of Lands in 2010, but not accepted by Langoni; further investigation was pending. Disputes regarding the land deal related to the new</td>
<td>Locher 2011 (field visit and interviews with Plantation Operations Manager Isaya Mwangwone, DLOs Pangani and village leaders in Feb and Apr 2011) Locher 2013 (interviews with former Plantation Operations Manager and former Town Planner Pangani in Feb 2013) Company’s website: <a href="http://www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx">www.greenresources.no/Plantations.aspx</a> (accessed 16.02.2013)</td>
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</table>
village boundaries between Meka and Mseko; Complaints regarding dubious land survey and size of given land in Kwakibuyu.

In all villages negotiated compensation in kind, not cash (village office, class rooms, dispensary etc.); many parts of compensation provided already; Plantation started in Mtonga and Kwakibuyu; nursery in Langoni. In early 2011 the plantations in Kwakibuyu were abandoned, according to the company mainly due to bad soil conditions (all above information by Locher 2011).

In July 2012, Green Resources closed down Tanga Forest due to poor tree performance, ecological reasons and probably also due to the conflicts around the land deals; all plantations and facilities were handed over to the district; in Feb 2013, the land was under process of being transferred back to become village land again (Locher 2013).

‘The 1 340ha Tanga Forest plantation is (...) currently spread over 9 500ha in Pangani district (...). Out of this area, an estimated 6 000ha is plantable, with 2 500ha set aside for conservation and 1 000ha for research and other uses. (...) the land acquisition process is slow. (...) The aim (...) is to sequestrate carbon to partly finance planting, and to harvest wood for pulp production, renewable energy and to grow high-quality hardwoods...’ (company’s website in Feb 2013, entry undated, but seems to be from 2009)
4.6 Some observations on the situation of land deals in Tanzania

Based on our experiences and the above compilations we make the following observations. Also after extensive literature review, online research, and our own investigations, the number of non-transparent projects remains high. For many projects it is still not possible to say whether they are only announced intentions (that might have been withdrawn already) or whether they are about to be realised in the near future. However, we believe that the vast majority of projects established on the ground could be covered in our compilation (with perhaps a few small exceptions).

Media reports are a good starting point for research, but taken alone they provide a distorted picture in two ways. They might miss out on several deals, particularly smaller deals, and may also miss those deals, which create fewer conflicts and consequently draw less public attention. On the other hand, media articles often report the stated intentions of investors as if they were established land deals. The same applies to investors’ websites. However, such announcements do not necessarily materialise in the announced time. Examples are the CAMS Agri-Energy Tanzania Ltd that had to reduce its plans for 208 000ha, announced in the media in 2008 (Reuters 2008), to 18 000ha or even less (a plan which also has not been realised up to date) and the investment plans of Saudi Arabian investors, published in Reuters 2009 (Karam 2009), which so far seem to remain just an intention. Media reports might further have a tendency to round up figures on land sizes (Friis & Reenberg 2009).

Many deals with the purpose of producing biofuels (mainly jatropha), announced around 2005–2008 and reported in 2008 and 2009, did not materialise so far. Besides seven projects which we list as ceased or not realised at all, we list 25 biofuel projects as (potentially) active. However, the majority of them are reported as having problems with funding or with the land acquisition process, or there is only little information available even from the district officials, which might indicate that they are not active yet or anymore. The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 and a poor understanding of energy feed-stocks, among many other reasons, have driven a number of companies such as BioShape Tanzania Ltd and Sun Biofuels out of the business (Sulle & Nelson unpublished). It further seems that there have not been many recent interests in this sector in the last few years. The decreased interest can be ascribed to the limited economic viability of some envisioned biofuel crops and also to a lack of policy, institutional, and legal frameworks in Tanzania (Hultman et al. 2012; Sulle & Nelson unpublished).

Land acquisitions for the purpose of food production, particularly rice, sugar and oil, are now being planned and are beginning to materialise. It remains to be seen whether this boom is more effective and longer-lasting than the previous biofuels boom.

Forestry plantations play a considerable role in terms of approved land deals and planted area. As observed during our own data collection (Sulle 2012; Locher 2011), apart from the production of soft and hard wood, investors in forestry plantations target additional income from carbon sequestration, so far mainly on the voluntary market, but also with the aim of getting registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a climate change mitigation measure developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This corresponds to the analysis by Deininger et al (2011), (see also Cotula 2012) on the rise of forestry plantations globally. However, the largest forest investor in Tanzania so far, Green Resources AS, has closed one of its subsidiaries (see Tanga Forests Ltd in Table 4) and might withdraw some of its other investment plans. Hence, the relevance of this sector in Tanzania remains uncertain.

Based on our tables, the following rough numbers on the extent of land deals in Tanzania can be given: Foreign land deals, whether announced, ongoing or concluded land deal processes (Table 1) amount to a total area of around 1 000 000 ha. However, of this amount, only around 200 000 ha can be considered as

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9 It must be noted that ceased land deals do not remain without negative consequences on local level.
fairly confirmed (reported by at least two different sources) and being under process. Fairly confirmed, but just announced are deals with an area of 350 000ha (of which 325 000ha are from the announced AgriSol Energy deal). Information on the remaining 450 000ha is either based on one source only, or there are conflicting sources. The table on domestic deals (Table 2) lists land deals with around 20 000ha. Investments with unclear origin (Table 3) amount to around 37 000ha (of which most are based on rather vague data sources). Our Table 4 on ceased or aborted deals lists twelve projects (whereas projects of the same company in different districts are counted only once) with a total of around 300 000ha. Of these, nearly half had been under process already; the others were just ‘intended’. In addition to these, there are temporarily ceased projects that have been sold to other investors, which are included in Table 1 as ongoing land deals.

As stated earlier, it was not our original aim to focus on domestic land deals. That is one reason for Table 2 on domestic deals being rather short. The other reason is that we included only deals above 200ha in our compilation, and the size of purely domestic deals tends to be much smaller than for deals involving transnational investors (for a list showing domestic deals, see Mwamila et al. 2009; Bengesi et al. 2009). Chachage and Mbunda 2009 provide a detailed overview of the Tanzanians owning the former National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) farms, and other land portions accumulated by local elites. Whilst the total area of land under domestic investors is considerably little compared to the area requested by international investors, in our view, this phenomenon deserves more public and academic attention in the near future.

5 Some considerations on the reproduction of data

In this study, we presented a number of issues related to the documentation and reproduction of data on land deals in Tanzania, which in our view is partly imprecise and inadequate. While acknowledging the challenges of representing a phenomenon as non-transparent and dynamic as global land grabbing, we propose a more specific and rigorous documentation of data, which allows the tracking of the primary sources of all the information given in compilations of land deals. We also propose to pay more attention to acquiring detailed information on the stage of land deals in future — information that is currently often vague or not available at all in compilations on land deals. We consider such information as helpful in better understanding the processes of land acquisitions and the related behaviour of investors and in interpreting contradictory indications for a specific project. Further, data on the earlier status of the land at question (in terms of property rights and usage) is important if one wants to understand the decision making process and the potential consequences at local level in a specific case. It would help to gain an overview on the patterns of land use change in Tanzania induced by land acquisitions.

Besides considerations regarding data (re)production, we provided a compilation of data on the acquisition of land, mainly by foreign investors in Tanzania for (broadly defined) agricultural purposes. The presented tables are based on a careful literature review and on own empirical data. The overview does not claim to be complete, but it provides a traceable set of data on both active and inactive or cancelled land deal projects.

We hope that with our study we can make a contribution to a transparent basis for the much needed policy debates and decisions in Tanzania. Our data might also serve as a point of reference for the Tanzanian government’s intention of providing an overview on foreign land deals by April 2013. Further, we believe that our compilation of traceable, carefully collected and reviewed data and the commented reference list provide a helpful starting point for future research projects in Tanzania.

Finally, we hope that our proposal for a more precise documentation of data sources will be taken up by other authors for future publications. This could help in representing the global phenomenon of 'land grabs' even more credibly and in using the resources of involved researchers and activists more effectively in order to tackle the urgent concerns related to large-scale land deals.
6 References

6.1 Annotated list of references providing information about land deals in Tanzania

   - This publication is identical to Bengesi et al. 2009, for more information see respective reference.

   - Information about Kilombero Plantations Ltd.

   - Anonymous way of presenting their case studies in Morogoro and Dodoma.

   - Field visits and interviews with company’s management and stakeholders in Dar es Salaam

   - Media article on Pharos Fund’s plans.

   - Field visits to Rufiji (SEKAB), Kisarawe (SunBiofuels), Bagamoyo (SEKAB), Lindi (BioMassive), Kilwa (BioShape), and Arusha (Diligent and KAKUTE) and Meru: Table on ‘biofuels companies operating in Tanzania’, source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives.
   - This publication is identical to ActionAid 2009.


   - Field work in Morogoro, Manyara, Kilimanjaro and Coastal Regions.

   - Exploratory field visit to Kilombero district in Aug 2010, documentary research (gov data, media, websites); data on Kilombero Plantations Ltd, Kilombero Sugar Company Ltd, Kilombero Farms Company Lt, Green Resources (Iringa), SEKAB BioEnergy (Tanzania) Ltd (but not Bioshape, although mentioned in methodology chapter).


   - Short field visit (May and June 2010), data about Bioshape and New Forests Company.

    - For Tanzania: same data as in Sulle and Nelson (2009).


- Chapter on uncertainties of media data.


- Data from Grain 2008; von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2009 (own field studies in Mali, Madagascar, Laos, Cambodia, not Tanzania).

18. HAKIARDHI (forthcoming) *Assessment of bioenergy sector in Tanzania: A critical inquiry into the threats, benefits and opportunities to small scale producers and sustainable environmental management*.


- Fieldwork on SunBiofuels (explorative, for case study to be conducted later).


- Fieldwork (in 2007?), contracted by the Kilombero Valley Teak Company (KVTC) for scientific study as part of the undergoing certification from the Forestry Stewardship Scheme (FSC) and ISO 14001.


- Data on SunBiofuels based on investor’s website, media reports and fieldwork, mainly interviews with government officials; for table on ‘companies involved in biofuels’. Ministry of Energy and Minerals, July 2010, for land acquired and requested (in ha) Sulle & Nelson (2009).


- Sources for table: data from the MEM.


- Announcement of Saudi interest in 500 000ha of farmland in Tanzania.

Case studies on SunBiofuels Tanzania ltd., SEKAB BioEnergy Tanzania and Trinity Consultants Bio-energy, Tanzania: Based on field survey in five selected villages (Matipwili, Milo and Kidomole villages in Bagamoyo District and Palaka and Marumba villages in Kisarawe District); sources for table on Status of bio-fuels investments in Tanzania: Kamanga (2008); Mwamila et al. (2009); Sulle/Nelson (2009) and fieldwork.


- Kulindwa’s information (in 2009 quoted by Sulle and Nelson in their publication) was fully included in the publication of Mwamila et al. 2009 (to which he was co-author).


- Fieldwork on peripheral urban land acquisition around Uluguru Mountains in Morogoro, carried out between April and September 2008, government surveying and allocating urban peripheral lands.


- Field work on the analysis of the village’s minutes in districts of Rufiji, Kisarawe, Bagamoyo and Kilwa where biofuels companies obtained and some were still obtaining land.

29. Land Matrix: online global data base provided by the CDE, CIRAD, GIGA, GIZ and ILC on the Land Portal. Accessed on 31 January at: www.landportal.info/landmatrix


- Fieldwork in Kilwa district (Mavuji village, on Bioshape company), Kisarawe district (Mtamba, Sunbiofuels), Kigoma rural district (Mahembe, Felisa) and Njombe district (Ujindile, four tea and a tree company).


- Fieldwork about the New Forests Company in Kilolo district in Aug 2010, Jan and May 2011, interviews with district officials, local leaders and villagers.

32. Locher M and Müller-Böker U (forthcoming) Foreign investors in rural areas in the Global South: Expectations, practices, and frustrations — Two European forestry companies in Tanzania.

- Fieldwork about the New Forests Company in Kilolo district and Tanga Forests Ltd. in Pangani district in Aug 2010, Jan-May 2011, interviews with district officials, local leaders and villagers and companies' staff.


- Reviewed literature on biofuels initiatives in Tanzania.


- Data about Africa Green Oils Ltd; According to the author’s statement, the article is based on fieldwork between June-Sep 2009, the article though is dated April 22, 2009. The information was not included in our table due to this inconsistency.
   - Provides relevant literature in liquid biofuels by assessing policies and strategies in place, business models, feed-stocks as well as socio-economic and environmental issues associated to biofuels.


   - Fieldwork in Rufiji and Kilombero districts in May and June 2011; existing literature including media.


   - Announcement of KRC project


   - Meetings and interviews on Agrisol Energy with ‘involved individuals’ 2011.


   - Announcement of KRC project

   - Reports the parliament debate on land allocation issues and provides references to previous reports.


   - Fieldwork; Chachage and Baha; media reports.

- Announcement of KRC project.


- Field work on SunBiofuels in Kisorawe, probably in April 2010.


- Sources for the information in the table on page 77 unclear.

- Sources for the information in the table on page 37 unclear; study gives estimates of available land for the production of different crops both for food or energy/biofuels.

- Media article about BioShape.

- Investor’s information about planned project of Africa Biofuel and Emission Reduction Company (Tanzania) Ltd.

- Information about Africa Green Oils Ltd quoting their (now inactive) website.

6.2 Other relevant references - partly annotated

- The brief provides the up-to-date analysis of the customary land tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa


73. Deininger and Byerlee (2011) Rising global interest in farmland: Can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits? World Bank: Washington, DC


- Reported the government restriction to plant jatropha in Mbarali.


Their source of information seems to be Deininger and Byerlee 2011; World Bank’s personnel personal communications. The paper is relevant for insights on policy aspects and the extent of investments in large-scale agricultural deals.
A convergence of factors has been driving a revaluation of land by powerful economic and political actors. This is occurring across the world, but especially in the global South. As a result, we see unfolding worldwide a dramatic rise in the extent of cross-border, transnational corporation-driven and, in some cases, foreign government-driven, large-scale land deals. The phrase ‘global land grab’ has become a catch-all phrase to describe this explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions revolving around the production and sale of food and biofuels, conservation and mining activities.

The Land Deal Politics Initiative launched in 2010 as an ‘engaged research’ initiative, taking the side of the rural poor, but based on solid evidence and detailed, field-based research. The LDPI promotes in-depth and systematic enquiry to inform deeper, meaningful and productive debates about the global trends and local manifestations. The LDPI aims for a broad framework encompassing the political economy, political ecology and political sociology of land deals centred on food, biofuels, minerals and conservation. Working within the broad analytical lenses of these three fields, the LDPI uses as a general framework the four key questions in agrarian political economy: (i) who owns what? (ii) who does what? (iii) who gets what? and (iv) what do they do with the surplus wealth created? Two additional key questions highlight political dynamics between groups and social classes: ‘what do they do to each other?’, and ‘how do changes in politics get shaped by dynamic ecologies, and vice versa?’ The LDPI network explores a range of big picture questions through detailed in-depth case studies in several sites globally, focusing on the politics of land deals.

Abstract

In the absence of an easily available source of reliable up-to-date data on foreign land deals in Tanzania, many reports have been published that attempt to provide an overview of these deals. While providing this overview is challenging due to the dynamic and non-transparent nature of the ‘land grab’ phenomenon itself, it has become even more debatable due to certain questionable methods of using and quoting existing data. This leads to several flaws including the "virtual survival" of cancelled land deals "on paper". The consequences are an unnecessarily blurred picture of the land deal situation in Tanzania, and thus an inadequate basis for related political decisions or social actions and a misleading starting point for new research projects. In this paper we illustrate some of the flaws in the use of data so far and give an updated and carefully grounded overview of foreign land deals in Tanzania as of December 2012. Our compilation illustrates that, unlike in the past few years, biofuel projects are no longer the priority of foreign investors. Instead, they are focusing on the production of food crops such as rice, sugar and oil, as well as forestry plantations. The overview does not claim to be complete, but it does provide a traceable set of data, which can serve as a basis for further research as well as for much needed policy debates and decisions.